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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report studies the current GB policy and regulatory environment regarding electricity markets and 
how these market rules can potentially be a barrier to the development of new local energy markets at 
the distribution level across GB. Barriers could be in the form of existing policies and regulations, or a 
lack of enabling policies and regulations. This report also discusses the changes which are currently 
emerging in the national and regional energy markets and how these changes could impact on the 
creation of local energy markets in GB, either negatively or positively. We have also contrasted these 
changes with international examples where appropriate. 
The GB energy market is currently undertaking rapid change, which is recognised by many key 
stakeholders. Change can be attributed to energy sector decarbonisation targets (Shakoor et al., 2017) 
combined with the emergence of new technologies in generation, demand and control systems (Ramos 
et al., 2016).  
Much of this change is happening at the distribution network level (Ruester et al., 2014). Distribution 
has traditionally been seen as the ‘junior’ partner to transmission, (Nolan, 2015) fed from the much 
larger arteries of the transmission network and operated passively. However, as distributed generation 
grows and large scale power station capacity falls, more power will be connected at the distribution 
level (WPD, 2017b) which will have a major impact on the roles of the GB Transmission System 
Operator (TSO) and the Distribution Network Operators (DNOs), with the DNOs potentially becoming 
major operators in procurement of services and system balancing in future (Nolan, 2015).  
The amount of generation in GB that is connected at the distribution level has doubled over the last 5 
years and now represents over a quarter of total GB capacity (Ofgem, 2017k). This creates a number of 
issues for the DNOs regarding the impact of distributed generation on networks which were not 
originally designed to accommodate generation, but which were built with a ‘fit and forget’ approach 
(Ramos et al., 2016).  These issues include voltage deviations, line losses, system balance and reserve 
issues, robustness and power quality. 
Conversely, the growth in distributed generation has the potential to transform the current market 
structure of electricity trading and introduce new services and markets. New emergent services could 
include dynamic pricing, aggregation, peer-to-peer trading and various demand side management 
options which can help to overcome system balancing issues; whilst new markets such as local energy 
markets can provide a route for smaller providers to deliver these services.  
To enable this transition from a top-down, one-way system to a much more complex distributed 
network, the roles of key market actors will need to evolve (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a). A number of 
activities are already being progressed by BEIS, Ofgem, National Grid, the ENA1 and the DNOs as will 
be discussed in this report. However, there is much to be determined over the next few years in relation 
to the current monopoly roles of the TSO and the DNOs (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a); as well as the role of 
suppliers, aggregators and the emergent roles that might be established by new innovative market 
entrants.  
                                                                    
1 Energy Network Association 
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Current policies, regulations and market rules all revolve around the Supplier Hub model (see Section 
2.1). However, a different market structure will be needed for an industry that transforms from a top-
down system to one that fully enables distributed generation and peer-to-peer trading with a small 
amount of high voltage interconnection between distributed generation and smaller more localised 
networks  (Elexon, 2017a). 
As system flexibility will be the key enabler in delivering this transformation (Shakoor et al., 2017), 
Government needs to ensure that independent flexibility markets are made more accessible for small 
energy providers, by removing regulatory barriers, and ensuring value for flexibility. For this reason 
greater strategic direction is required from BEIS and Ofgem. 
These changes in the energy market can be capitalised on by smaller generators and distributed energy 
resource providers, but only if the correct market conditions are established to enable their successful 
entry. This report will therefore discuss barriers to current markets and opportunities for future 
markets, where the Cornwall Local Energy Market could establish routes to market for local energy 
providers and prosumers. 
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DOCUMENT ROADMAP 
This report is structured in two main parts: 
PART 1 - CURRENT MARKET DESIGN – which outlines the current state of play in GB markets and 
how they need to be adapted to incorporate the rise of DER. 
In Section 2 we discuss how electricity systems are changing in GB due to decarbonisation targets and 
the development of renewable and low carbon technologies, with much of the growth in renewable 
generation happening at the distribution level. This is increasingly leading to a need for change in how 
networks are managed and balanced, which in turn could also lead to the implementation of more 
distributed local energy markets. However, one of the central barriers to market change is the current 
supplier hub model which is also discussed. 
In Section 3 we look at the existing GB markets and highlight the barriers for small distributed 
generators, storage and DSR providers to participate in them. We also discuss current proposals by 
BEIS / Ofgem to improve access by DER to these markets. 
In Section 4 we discuss how the network operators will need to re-evaluate their roles and 
responsibilities and develop new working practices. DER will increasingly cause disruption to the 
current way of balancing the transmission and distribution networks, leading to a need for a re-
evaluation of the way in which the networks will function in future and the opportunities this could 
create for developing local energy markets. 
In Section 5 we look at current Ofgem consultations regarding network charging and how these 
changes could potentially cause a barrier to small generators and behind-the-meter prosumers. 
PART 2 - POSSIBLE MARKET CHANGES – which outlines changes which could facilitate the rise of 
DER and the creation of local energy markets. 
In Section 6 we look at some of the new technologies and market approaches which could facilitate 
local energy markets. These include DSR, storage, the role of aggregators in enabling smaller providers 
to access the market as well as new market approaches such as Peer-to-Peer trading and Locational 
Marginal Pricing. However, there are regulatory and market barriers which need to be addressed in all 
cases. 
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1. INTRODUCTION – THE CORNWALL LOCAL ENERGY MARKET PROJECT 
The Cornwall Local Energy Market (LEM) project is a three-year trial from 2017 to 2020 jointly funded 
through the European Regional Development Fund and Centrica. The project is led by Centrica in 
association with project partners Western Power Distribution, National Grid, Imperial College London 
and the University of Exeter (UoE). 
The LEM project will create a local marketplace for flexible demand, generation and storage in 
Cornwall.  The project will achieve this by designing and building an independent market platform 
where the DNO and the TSO can procure flexibility from distribution connected assets; allowing both 
supply and demand side providers to participate in trading and optimising capacity on the network.  
This model of electricity trading and network operation differs significantly from the way in which the 
UK electricity system currently operates. Markets and network operation have historically been 
designed to reflect the ‘conventional’ centralised configuration of the system, rather than supporting 
smaller scale, more active local participation.  Policies and regulations in place at the moment may 
therefore act as a barrier to the development of a model which allows more local trading of power and 
flexibility.     
UoE’s remit in Phase 1 (this report) is to analyse the current GB policy and regulatory environment to 
identify the regulatory barriers to establishing local energy markets and suggest possible solutions. 
The University of Exeter will also follow the LEM trial in Phase 2 by way of the development of an 
evaluation framework to assess customer expectations and experiences in trading with the LEM.  In 
light of this qualitative analysis UoE will then provide a final report in Phase 3 with recommendations 
for any regulatory change required in order to allow the future development of other local energy 
markets across GB. 
 
CREATING THE UK’S FIRST LOCAL ENERGY MARKET 
Cornwall is outperforming most local authorities in England and Wales in its renewable energy 
generation, currently ranking 4th out of 56 local authority areas, with a total renewable capacity of 
around 764 MW, of which 72% comes from solar (where the authority is ranked 2 / 56) and 17% comes 
from onshore wind (Green Alliance, 2016), there are also developments taking place locally in biomass, 
hydro, geothermal and marine technologies. 
However, the DNO, WPD, claims that this abundance of renewable energy generation has put the local 
electricity grid under severe strain, resulting in WPD creating a waiting list, or queue, for new renewable 
energy projects seeking new connections in Constraint Managed Zones (CMZ). The queue is governed 
on the principle of last in, first out (LIFO) which determines that those last in will be curtailed first 
during times of system stress. This has a severe detrimental impact on the financial viability of new 
projects, by seriously curbing potential output.  
Cornwall Council meanwhile has an ambitious vision for a local renewable energy economy. Cornwall’s 
Energy Future document (Cornwall Council, 2017) identifies clear targets for 2030 which include:- 
• Meeting 100% of Cornwall’s electricity demand from renewable and low carbon sources; 
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• Increasing the proportion of Cornwall’s energy that is owned locally to 50% and 
• Increasing the proportion of Cornwall’s energy ‘spend’ retained within the local economy to 30%. 
 
These targets are not likely to be met in the current market paradigms and in a constrained network. 
The Cornwall LEM project will therefore become an important asset in unlocking the network through 
working in partnership with WPD to overcome system constraints. The LEM will do this through the 
trialling of several different innovative solutions. 
The Cornwall LEM is therefore an enabler, aiming to release network capacity as a result of more 
intelligent management of demand, generation and storage particularly in constrained areas of the 
grid. It will incentivise participants to turn up, down, export or import depending on what renewable 
generation is doing on the grid in real time. 
The LEM project will do this through designing and building a local marketplace platform for the 
network to request, and the market to provide, flexible demand, generation and storage to help 
optimise capacity on the local grid. The platform will assist in the co-ordination of with distribution 
networks and the transmission system. 
LEM customers in the initial three-year trial period will include I&C customers, SMEs, and one hundred 
domestic properties.  
It is anticipated that the LEM platform could help to increase the amount of renewable generation in 
Cornwall in the following ways: - 
• Freeing up grid capacity with more intelligent management of demand, generation and storage 
• Reducing the cost for existing and new connections 
• Improving the business case for renewables after cuts to feed in tariffs 
• Improving the ease and cost of connecting to the distribution network 
• Increasing productivity of the renewables that are constrained at times of peak generation 
• Increasing the capacity of existing sites 
 
The Cornwall LEM participants will also be seeking to sell their flexibility services into a range of 
National Grid services; but for local markets to succeed in GB and elsewhere, regulatory and market 
barriers to such markets must be understood and addressed. That is the purpose of this report.  
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Part 1 CURRENT MARKET DESIGN 
2. GB ELECTRICITY SYSTEMS ARE CHANGING  
The GB energy market is undertaking rapid change, which is recognised by many key stakeholders. 
Change can be attributed to energy sector decarbonisation targets (Shakoor et al., 2017) combined 
with the emergence of new technologies in generation, demand and control systems (Ramos et al., 
2016).  
The European Union regulatory target states that at least 20% of the energy consumed in the EU in 
2020 should be from renewable resources, growing to at least 27% by 2030 (European Commission, 
2016a). The EU also commits itself to becoming the world leader in renewable energy, and the global 
hub for developing technically advanced and competitive renewable energies (European Commission, 
2017). 
The EUs 'Clean Energy Package' (European Commission, 2016a) presents regulatory proposals to 
achieve these objectives, and at the same time accelerate the EU economy's clean energy transition. 
With a turnover of around €144bn in 2014, the renewables industry is already a major contributor to the 
EU economy (European Commission, 2017). 
Much of the growth in renewable generation in GB is happening at the distribution network level 
(Ruester et al., 2014). Indeed, the amount of generation in GB that is connected at the distribution level 
has doubled over the last 5 years and now represents over a quarter of total GB capacity (Ofgem, 
2017k). This creates a number of issues for the Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) regarding the 
impact of distributed generation on networks which were not originally designed to accommodate 
generation, but which were built with a ‘fit and forget’ approach (Ramos et al., 2016).  These issues 
include voltage deviations, line losses, system balance and reserve issues, robustness and power 
quality. 
Distribution has traditionally been seen as the ‘junior’ partner to transmission, (Nolan, 2015) fed from 
the much larger arteries of the transmission network and operated ‘passively’ i.e. without a need to 
forecast and actively manage network flows (WPD, 2017a). However, as distributed generation grows 
and large scale power station capacity falls, this will have a major impact on the roles of the GB 
Transmission System Operator (TSO) and the Distribution Network Operators (DNOs), with the DNOs 
potentially becoming major operators in procurement of services and system balancing in future 
(Nolan, 2015).  
Distributed generation could also have a major impact on the cost of balancing the networks. In 2016-
17 National Grid’s costs of balancing the electricity system increased by around £250 million, to over 
£1.1 billion (Ofgem, 2017m). However analysis undertaken by Imperial College (Shakoor et al., 2017) 
suggests that reduced system operation costs of between 25% and 40% could be achieved through the 
deployment of new, cheaper, flexibility sources connected at the distribution level rather than by 
conventional generation. 
Therefore, distributed generation can be exploited to establish a more efficient, cleaner and cheaper 
electricity system given the right regulatory environment. Distributed energy resources (DER) such as 
storage and small renewable and low carbon technologies have the potential to provide downward or 
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upward adjustment to the system, contributing towards balanced power (Ruester et al., 2014); and 
flexibility services could be utilised by the DNOs to solve capacity and voltage constraints on the 
networks, deferring or even avoiding expensive grid reinforcement costs (Vallés et al., 2016). 
These changes have the potential to transform the current market structure of electricity trading and 
introduce new services and markets. Research undertaken by Navigant suggests  that by 2030 
distribution grids will have completely changed their operations to incorporate the rise in DER, with 
customers trading their self-generated power on the open market (Ravens and Lawrence, 2017). New 
emergent services can include dynamic pricing, aggregation, peer-to-peer trading and various demand 
side management options which can help to overcome system balancing issues; whilst new markets 
such as local energy markets can provide a route for smaller providers to aggregate in the delivery of 
these services.  
To enable this transition from a top-down, one-way system to a much more complex distributed 
network, the roles of key market actors will need to evolve (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a). A number of 
activities are already being progressed by BEIS, Ofgem, National Grid, the ENA2 and the DNOs as will 
be discussed in Section 4. However, there is much to be determined over the next few years in relation 
to the current monopoly roles of the TSO and the DNOs (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a); as well as the role of 
suppliers, aggregators and the emergent roles that can be established by new innovative market 
entrants.  
 
2.1 CHANGING THE SUPPLIER HUB MODEL  
One major barrier to the development of local energy markets is the current role of suppliers. When the 
energy industry was privatised in the late 1980s, the market was designed with suppliers as the core 
intermediary between customers and the energy system, in what is known as the ‘supplier hub’ model. 
The current market arrangements have evolved and developed around this principle and the supplier’s 
role is now entrenched in legal frameworks, licensing arrangements, and industry codes, regulations 
and rules (Ofgem, 2017e).  
However, a different market structure will be needed for an industry that transforms from a top-down 
system to one that fully enables distributed generation and peer-to-peer (P2P) trading with a small 
amount of high voltage interconnection between distributed generation and smaller more localised 
networks. 
Ofgem issued a call for evidence (CfE) on the future of supply market arrangements on 14 November 
2017 to inform its consideration of whether the current supplier hub model is still fit for purpose in light 
of innovative changes to electricity markets. With potential changes to the roles of other market actors 
such as the DNOs, the SO and aggregators; plus the emerging innovators such as the Centrica LEM 
project, Ofgem suggest that the supplier hub model may no longer be fit for purpose and provides a 
barrier for new trading arrangements, such as P2P to enter the marketplace.  
 
                                                                    
2 Energy Network Association 
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Figure 1 Current Supplier Role 
 
Source: (Ofgem, 2017e) 
As the entire industry currently operates on the assumption that a single supplier connects to the active 
import data from a single meter, and a single supplier connects to the active export data; a requirement 
for more than one supplier to access data from a single individual meter would require significant 
industry system changes for settlement (Elexon, 2017a).  
Elexon stated in response to the CfE that radical and strategic change to the current energy market 
arrangements need to happen, however, in order to allow innovative approaches to emerge  and to 
allow for the potential contractual relationships the consumer will have in future with both existing/new 
energy supplier(s), and new service/technology providers (Elexon, 2017a).  
Change to the supplier hub model would therefore be an enabler for the LEM. Allowing customers to 
have more than one energy supplier at a time; allowing customers to trade their excess generation 
between themselves without transacting through a licensed energy supplier; and allowing customers to 
sell their generation to whomever they chose would open up access to new distributed markets and 
services, such as P2P, which are currently inaccessible due to the existing regulation.  
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3. REGULATORY BARRIERS IN EXISTING MARKETS 
SECTION OVERVIEW 
To date the main route to trade flexibility in GB is at the national level through various procurement 
mechanisms, and across different time horizons. However, these markets were established on the 
presumption of large scale generation, connected at the transmission level, meeting most of GBs 
electricity demand and therefore there are existing access problems for smaller generators and 
flexibility providers. Indeed where these technologies are successfully accessing these markets their 
percentage share can be very low.  Access to these existing markets are therefore a valuable revenue 
stream for local assets until localised trading arrangements such as the LEM have been developed as 
discussed later in this report (Section 6).  
3.1 GB MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGIES 
The main national markets are: 
• Capacity Market: capacity contracts are awarded through auctions which are held at 4 years and 1 
year ahead of delivery. 
• Wholesale Energy Market: bilateral trading takes place from several years ahead up to Gate 
Closure, one hour prior to transmission (T-1 hour). 
• Balancing Market: National Grid as System Operator (SO) maintains demand and supply balance 
post Gate Closure, through a system of bids and offers in Balancing Mechanism Units (BMUs). 
• Ancillary (balancing) services: the SO also ensures that supply meets demand at all times and that 
system frequency remains within statutory limits. There are currently several different ancillary 
service routes, which are procured in different ways (i.e. tendered or bilateral trading). 
(Shakoor et al., 2017). 
 
These national markets can be accessed by a number of different technologies. Table 1 GB Markets & 
Technologies shows the technologies that are currently providing these services (√) and those that are 
technically capable but which are restricted (*). Restrictions could be through commercial constraints, 
market limitations or lack of incentives (Shakoor et al., 2017). However even where these technologies 
are already providing services, their market share may still form a very small percentage e.g. demand 
side response (DSR) only had a 6% share of ancillary services in 2016 (PA Consulting Group, 2016). As 
National Grid is the main contractor of DSR services in GB at present (Lo, 2017) increased access to the 
Balancing Market and ancillary services will be critical to DSRs success until such time as other new 
markets become accessible.   
LEM participants will be utilising a variety of renewable and low carbon technologies (LCT) such as 
CHP, batteries, solar and wind as well as offering DSR solutions. Table 1 shows that these technologies 
are capable of accessing these markets (and in some cases they are already to a greater or lesser 
extent) but that there are limitations to be overcome to trade across all of them. 
The focus of this report is to determine whether these limitations are due to a market or regulatory 
barrier to access. It is not within this report’s remit to discuss any technical or operational limitations 
associated with these technologies.  
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Table 1 GB Markets & Technologies 
Technology Capacity 
Market 
Wholesale 
Market 
Balancing 
Market 
Main Ancillary Services (2017) 
STOR Fast 
Reserve 
Frequency 
Response 
Enhanced 
Frequency 
Response 
Coal √ √ √   √  
Nuclear √ √ *   *  
Gas - CCGT √ √ √ √ * √  
Gas - OCGT √ √ √ √ * √  
CHP √ √ √ √ * √  
Biomass √ √ √ * * √  
Engines √ √ √ √ √   
Wind * √ √ √ * √  
Solar - PV  √ *  * *  
Solar - CSP * * * * * *  
Hydro (reservoir) √ √ √ √ * √  
Marine * * * * * *  
Hydro (pump 
storage) 
√ √ √ √ √ √  
Storage 
(batteries) 
√ √ * √ * √ √ 
DSR √ * √ √ √ √ * 
√ Technology is providing the service    
*Technology can potentially provide the service but is currently restricted due to economic or market limitations, or requires 
some technical improvements 
Blank cells indicate absence of evidence to map technologies onto the service 
Source: (Poyry analysis as shown in Shakoor et al., 2017)  
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3.2 ANCILLARY SERVICES 
Table 1  above shows the main ancillary services called upon by the TSO, but in effect there have been a 
plethora of different services utilised to date which has caused several issues for new entrants and 
flexibility providers (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017b). Issues identified by consultees during BEIS and Ofgem’s 
‘Call for Evidence’ (CfE) in November 2016 include a lack of transparency in different products; 
overlapping of products with different specifications and procurement processes; short contract 
lengths and procurement processes not being market-based i.e. bilaterally traded (BEIS and Ofgem, 
2017b p.19). This is recognised by National Grid: 
“In many cases the requirement is being driven by several system issues which interact, and this 
interaction is not communicated to the market in advance of assessment. Furthermore, 
requirements can change from tender to tender as a result of variations in some of the 
underlying system issues with little or no explanation to tendering parties. These issues 
together result in confusion over why certain tenders have been accepted and others have not, 
and also uncertainty over the stability and long-term sustainability of our markets” (National 
Grid, 2017f) 
A range of respondents to the CfE called for the reform of ancillary services in order to ease these 
difficulties. Requests included a ‘blended’ approach to procurement whereby multiple services were 
procured at the same time instead of trying to avoid the fragmentation of there currently being several 
different time windows over which different revenue streams could be secured (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017b 
p.27-28). 
In June 2017 National Grid published their ‘System Needs and Product Strategy’ (SNAPS) document 
(National Grid, 2017f) which sought to address some of these issues by proposing to reduce the array of 
ancillary services to 5 core areas of system need, to simplify access for demand side response and 
storage providers: 
1. Inertia and Rate of Change of Frequency (RoCoF) 
2. Frequency Response 
3. Reserve 
4. Reactive Power 
5. Black Start 
 
National Grid stated that they need to create a marketplace for balancing that encourages new and 
existing providers, and all new technology types and which opens up competition on a level playing 
field (National Grid, 2017f). The frequency response market in particular is expected to expand, 
becoming increasingly important as further renewable capacity comes online and existing coal and gas 
plants close (Cornwall Insight, 2017).  
The SNAPS consultation response document published in September 17 (National Grid, 2017e) showed 
that consultees raised similar issues to those raised in Ofgem’s CfE, i.e. the need for greater 
transparency of the TSO’s day-to-day actions; a reduction in barriers to entry for new providers and 
more detail needed on the proposed simplification of products.  
Stacking of services was seen as important by 95.6% of respondents (National Grid, 2017e) and was 
also identified as a key issue through the Government’s CfE (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a). Respondents 
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thought that aligning procurement timescales between products would help with unlocking the 
potential for stacking. Stacking of services would allow flexibility providers to hold contracts to provide 
several different ancillary services (including transmission and distribution level services), rather than 
just one contract for a specific product. Stacking could also mean that providers may receive more than 
one payment per transaction event, if that event met more than one contract requirement at the same 
time. It will also allow providers to participate in the capacity market as well as ancillary services.  
Stacking will be important for the LEM in allowing access to several different revenue streams for 
customers’ flexibility provision, including new local products as well as access to traditional markets. 
A mix of both short-term markets and longer-term contracts was favoured by 61.7% of respondents, 
while 21.2% favoured short-term markets only. Only 17% of parties favoured long-term contracts only. 
Although both options (short term and long term) have their pros and cons, respondents felt that a 
mixture of both would be the most financially advantageous to both sides: 
“Short term markets can remove forecasting risk as well as allow for changes to parties’ 
commercial strategies. On the other hand, short term markets may not increase investor 
confidence. Longer term contracts would deliver a much lower cost of capital for investment. 
On the other hand, longer term contracts may create higher costs of balancing for the end 
consumer by locking in technologies which may be cheaper in the future or lock the SO in a 
procurement contract which may no longer be relevant as the system needs change over time” 
(National Grid, 2017e). 
National Grid are also facilitating a stakeholder-led programme ‘Power Responsive’ (National Grid, 
2017c) to stimulate increased participation in DSR and storage by 2020. One of the outcomes for the 
programme will be to ensure that DSR has equal opportunity with supply in contributing to balancing 
the system. To date Power Responsive has been focused on I&C customers only, but from 2018 
onwards it will also involve the smaller non-domestic and domestic sector. The TSO has an ambition to 
procure 30-50% of its balancing services by 2020 through demand side measures (BEIS and Ofgem, 
2016), which to-date stands at just 6% (PA Consulting Group, 2016). 
The ambition is to realise more non-wire alternatives (NWA) for system balancing instead of building 
extra capacity as usual. Flexibility services from DER are increasingly being used to mitigate both 
network management and energy balancing issues. For instance in 2017 National Grid procured over 
200MW of Enhanced Frequency Response (EFR) from battery storage (National Grid, 2017b).  
Aggregators enable the participation of small, individual loads in the ancillary services market. This not 
only increases the level of participation by DSR, but also provides reliability benefits through diversity. 
PA Consulting estimates that 82% of DSR participating in the STOR product is provided through 
aggregators (CRA, 2017a). 
National Grid launched their ‘Product Roadmap’ in December 2017 which incorporates the updates to 
the SNAPS consultation and sets out their first steps towards rationalising and simplifying frequency 
response and reserve products. Several frequency response products will be removed, including EFR, 
(although existing contracts won’t be cancelled) but the new standardised products should be easier for 
DSR providers to access and exclusivity clauses will be reviewed. Tenders can be made for short-term 
requirements on a monthly basis and longer-term requirements on a quarterly basis; and trial auctions 
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will also commence from late 2018 to establish whether auctions are seen as an easier vehicle for DSR 
providers to access these revenue streams rather than through tendering. 
3.3 WHOLESALE MARKET 
The wholesale electricity market is seen as particularly difficult for small generators to enter directly 
due to the costs involved with registering, licensing and trading in this market. Some of these costs are 
related to rules concerning the Balancing Market (BM) which are discussed in more detail in 3.4. 
The wholesale market is moderately concentrated, with eight generators providing three-quarters of 
metered volumes in 2016 as shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 2 Market shares of wholesale supply (2016) 
 
Source: (Ofgem, 2017m) 
Ofgem introduced new rules to accessing the wholesale market in 2014 to create a ‘more level playing 
field’ for independent suppliers and generators, to increase liquidity in the market. In terms of 
independent generators, the rule changes were supposed to enable them to compete more effectively 
against the Big 6 (Ofgem, 2013) through ensuring the availability of a range of longer-term products, to 
support hedging of risk of exposure to large changes to prices (Ofgem, 2014). Hedging is seen as 
important for independent generators in being certain of the price they will get for selling their power. 
However, as can be seen by Figure 2 this has had little impact to date on the wholesale market, due to 
several other inhibiting factors as discussed below.  
There are currently two routes of entry for small generators to the wholesale market:-  
• Central Volume Allocation (CVA) agreements which allows generators to access the market 
directly, and 
• Supplier Volume Allocation (SVA) agreements which involve partnering with a licensed supplier, via 
a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) i.e. indirectly. 
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CVA REQUIREMENTS 
In order to assist with smaller generators accessing the wholesale market directly, and to create more 
liquidity in the market, APX reduced the clip size on the Power UK Continuous Market from 1.0 MW to 
0.1 MW in 2011 and reduced the minimum collateral requirements. At the same time, the minimum 
order size was also lowered to 0.1 MW to enable smaller suppliers to access the Continuous Market 
(APX Power UK, 2011). However the Power UK Auction Market was not changed and the minimum clip 
size and order size therefore remains at 1MWh in this market. 
To qualify for CVA under the Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) requirements there are still many 
steps to go through and the costs are likely to outweigh any potential benefit. These include: 
The CVA Qualification process  
• Accession Form 
• £500 Accession Fee 
• Accession Agreement 
• Authorised signatories (BSCP38/5.1 and Director’s letter) 
• Order Communications Line Request  
• CVA Testing  
• Funds Accession Form BSCP301/04a  
• Credit Contacts 
• Party Registration (BSCP65/01) 
• Party Agent Registration  (BSCP71/05) 
• BM Unit Registration (BSCP15/4.1) 
• £250 per month BSC membership fee 
• £100 per month BMU registration fee 
Source: Elexon 2017 (prices correct as of Dec 2017) 
However, the monthly fees shown above, can be minimal in comparison to the costs of paying 
imbalance fees (should the generator not be able to fulfil its traded volume at gate closure) or the cost 
of buying any additional generation volume from a third party (in order to fulfil the requirement at gate 
closure). There are also huge costs involved in operating a trading team. The risks and requirements are 
therefore hugely weighted against small generators. 
As Table 1 showed, DSR is not at present directly accessing the wholesale market, although it 
technically has the potential to do so. This is due to the fact that there is no mechanism for DSR in 
making bids and offers in the BM as discussed below. In addition, independent aggregators currently do 
not have direct access to the Balancing Mechanism and the wholesale electricity market (Ofgem, 
2017g). 
Therefore, at present, for DSR to access the wholesale market, it would need to be traded indirectly 
through a supplier as per the SVA route below or through imbalance trading i.e. suppliers may have an 
incentive to activate DSR in order to improve their position in the BM. This may also create additional 
revenues to be shared with DSR providers and so potentially leads to all parties having an incentive to 
facilitate DSR (CRA, 2017a). 
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SVA 
The alternative to CVA is to partner with a licensed supplier who would register the generation asset on 
the generator’s behalf. The supplier would either register the asset as a stand-alone Balancing 
Mechanism Unit (BMU), at a charge of £100 per month, or would register it under their existing BMUs 
(where it would count as negative demand). (See 3.4 below for more detail.) 
Using this route however generators can only sell their power via their licensed supplier, usually 
through a PPA. This would therefore exclude DER from selling to both local buyers and on the 
Wholesale Market; although this could potentially change in future depending on Ofgem’s decision as 
to whether to make changes to the supplier hub model (Section 2.1). 
PPAs are normally offered for any generation over 250 KW, whilst generation under 250KW would be 
eligible for Feed in Tariff (FiT) payments from the supplier. 
 
3.4 BALANCING MARKET 
The BM is critical to balancing the system after gate closure: T-1 hour (one hour before transmission) 
when the SO takes control.  
National Grid accepts Bids and Offers in real-time, and as required, to match supply and demand in 
each half hour depending on whether they need to increase or reduce electricity generation (Elexon, 
2017f).  BMUs are used as units of trade within the BM. Each BMU is a collection of plant and/or 
apparatus, and is considered the smallest grouping that can be independently metered for Settlement 
(Elexon, 2017e).   
The offer of services to the BM is optional and not all generators participate, indeed the number of 
participants is reducing (National Grid, 2017f). This lowers competition in the market and makes energy 
balancing actions more expensive and the imbalance price more volatile.  
Currently there is no provision in the design of the BM for explicit DSR. In practice it can only be 
provided by the supplier of the DSR-provider. This is because there is no mechanism for making bids 
and offers for a customer’s potential demand, since there is no baselining of a customer’s demand 
against which such bids/offers may be assessed in order to monitor delivery. As a result, DSR is limited 
to provision by suppliers that may activate DSR in their customers (hence the recent decision for 
Flexitricity to apply for a suppliers licence) or via aggregators who sell to suppliers (CRA, 2017a). 
BM participation is also seen as particularly difficult for smaller embedded generators to access due to 
the volumes required by the SO, administrative costs and compliance with electricity licensing codes. 
Smaller generators are currently not able to aggregate generators at multiple sites into a single BMU, 
making it difficult for them to compete with larger power stations in the BM. The SO has operational 
issues with despatching smaller plants (Elexon, 2017d) and so allowing embedded generators to 
aggregate themselves into larger BMUs would give them more opportunity to participate in the BM, 
whilst also giving the SO access to further plant for system balancing purposes.  
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However, European balancing project TERRE could indirectly ease access to the BM for independent 
DSR providers and smaller generators, by requiring modifications to the Balancing and Settlement 
Code (BSC) in order for GB to comply with Project TERRE requirements.  
TERRE requirements state that DSR must be allowed to compete on a level playing field with traditional 
flexibility providers (AAMHE et al., 2016). 
Modification P344 (Elexon, 2017b) to the Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) seeks to align the BSC 
with TERRE requirements in order for the project to be implemented in 2018. In addition, Modification 
P355 (Elexon, 2017c) ‘Introduction of a BM Lite Balancing Mechanism’ raised by PeakGen  in June 
2017 builds on the Project TERRE concept by proposing that smaller generators should be allowed to 
aggregate into larger BMUs for use in the BM.  
PeakGen are strongly of the view that it is discriminatory that suppliers have access to aggregation 
options that are not available to embedded generators. If approved, Modification P355 would enable 
smaller generators to aggregate themselves into larger BMUs (suggested at between 5 and 200MW) 
which could be dispatched by the TSO. By allowing these sites into the BM, it would significantly 
increase the pool of generation open to National Grid and bring increased competition.  At present 
however DSR and DSR aggregators have been excluded from Modification P355, but PeakGen have 
stated that these should be considered alongside P355 (Elexon, 2017d).  
With the increased prevalence of DER in the energy market there is also an argument to be made for 
tighter timescales to gate closure. Balancing at 15 minutes or 10 minutes to gate closure would allow 
for a more granular and flexible market. In New Zealand, the SO applies a Reserve Management Tool to 
continually identify risk to the demand-supply balance in the system. It then determines an optimised 
portfolio of flexibility services and ensures its provision through the ancillary services market. Providers 
are then able to bid in reserve products right up to gate closure (Shakoor et al., 2017). 
 
3.5 CAPACITY MARKET 
Whilst the Capacity Market (CM) does not explicitly rule out renewable energy technologies from 
bidding in, the CM rules state that you cannot bid in if you receive support under the Renewables 
Obligation (RO) or the Contracts for Difference (CfD) schemes; which automatically rules out most 
renewable technologies. 
Even where these technologies can bid into CM auctions the CM rules require availability under strict 
terms i.e. they are given four hours of warning after which they are required to generate immediately 
on demand. Though a typical dispatch is only expected to last for 30 minutes, participants should be 
able to run their assets for up to four hours in accordance with the CM rules (Lockwood, 2017). 
There have also been issues identified with access to the CM for both DSR and storage (BEIS and 
Ofgem, 2016). The 2016/17 T-4 auction was the first time that battery storage had agreements 
awarded (around 500MW at a clearance price of £22.50 per kW) and although DSR saw significant 
growth (up from 450MW in the 2015 auction to around 1.4 GW) storage and DSR still accounted for only 
6.11% and 2.69% respectively (National Grid, 2017d).  
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However in the 2017/18 T-4 auction, only 153MW of battery storage capacity was contracted, due to 
developers unwilling or unable to accept contracts at the astonishingly low clearance price of £8.40 per 
kW; whilst DSR contracts stayed relatively stable at 1.2GW (Business Green, 2018). 
The participation of aggregators in the CM has been important in enabling the participation of 
individual DSR resources that would not meet the minimum capacity requirement on their own and 
indeed most of the awarded DSR agreements have been via aggregators (ibid). The minimum capacity 
required to participate in the main CM auction is 2 MW and 500 kW for the 2016/17 TA auction (CRA, 
2017a). 
DSR providers are only awarded one-year contracts in the CM which has been seen as a principal 
concern of aggregators as it can affect their access to finance (CRA, 2017a). On the one hand, whilst 
short term contracts may give DSR providers more flexibility to provide other services (by not being 
tied into a long-term agreement) longer term contracts would be attractive if providers were able to 
stack products across other service areas, allowing access to several different revenue streams. BEIS 
/Ofgem signalled in the Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan that they will allow stacking (BEIS and 
Ofgem, 2017a). 
The existence of the CM and the high volumes of capacity procured (up to four years in advance) will 
have both a direct and an indirect impact on any local energy market, including: 
• By determining a strict reliability standard in advance this can lead to over-contracting of capacity3, 
thereby limiting the scope for ancillary services (Reserve) to provide peak demand 
• The CM is keeping old plant operating which will prove direct competition for local assets looking to 
provide ancillary services 
• The CM has dampened wholesale electricity prices 
• By relying on the CM to manage future perceived problems it stifles investment and development 
of other low carbon solutions to the problem such as DSR, storage and demand reduction. 
 
The CM can therefore be seen as a backward looking policy in which opportunities for supporting the 
emergence of a new energy system has been missed (Lockwood, 2017). 
There is therefore an argument to be made over whether the CM should be shrunk to allow flexibility to 
provide real-time balancing of the system4. This argument will become more strident as distributed 
generation grows, and demand and demand volatility increases with higher adoption of EVs and other 
domestic technologies such as heat pumps. 
 
 
 
                                                                    
3 The reliability standard for the Capacity Market is set at 3 hours per year, whereas National Grid predicts that the loss of load 
expectation (LOLE) for Winter 2017/18, i.e. the likelihood of the lights going out, will be 0.01 hours (Lockwood, 2018). 
4 On 03/01/2018 National Grid recommended that capacity for both the T-1 2018/19 and T-4 2021/22 CM auctions be cut, by 1.1 
GW and 600 MW respectively (Stoker, 2018). 
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SECTION SUMMARY 
These existing markets were established against a background of large scale generators connected at 
the transmission level, providing most of GBs electricity supply. As large fossil fueled generators close 
and more renewable technologies are connected at the distribution level these markets should be 
adapted to enable access from DER and DSR providers. Smaller scale generation may also need to be 
aggregated to achieve the high volumes of electricity needed to meet market requirements, such as 
through independent aggregators. 
Barriers to access therefore need to be removed for DER and DSR providers and different ways of 
trading need to be examined in order to gain insight into which mechanisms are most useful; whether 
that be through aligning timescales for procurement or offering different procurement approaches 
such as bilateral trading or auctions. The barriers identified are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Barriers to Existing Markets 
Barrier Possible Solution 
ANCILLARY SERVICES  
Difficult for smaller generators, DSR 
and storage to access 
Rationalisation of services to simplify process and align timescales for 
tendering. National Grid will also trial auctions from late 2018. 
 
Too many products Product rationalisation taking place currently 
 
Multiple timelines for procurement Timelines to become aligned 
 
Stacking of contracts National Grid have stated that stacking across products will be 
possible, which will increase financial viability for small generators / 
DSR providers. 
 
WHOLESALE MARKET  
Difficult for small generators to access The clip size in the Power UK Continuous Market was reduced to 0.1 
MW to assist with smaller generators accessing the wholesale 
market. However, the costs, regulations and licensing requirements 
are prohibitive to many small generators. If they choose the SVA 
route then they can only trade with one licensed supplier. This may 
be overcome through any changes to the Supplier Hub model. 
Additionally Modification P355 (see BM section) may be helpful in 
overcoming access to the BM requirement. 
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No provision for explicit DSR in the 
wholesale market 
DSR currently can only be provided by the supplier of the DSR-
provider as there is no mechanism for making bids and offers for a 
customer’s potential demand, since there is no baselining of a 
customer’s demand against which such bids/offers may be assessed. 
However Modification P344 to the BSC could be helpful. 
 
Lack of access for aggregators Create a new route for independent aggregators to access the BM. 
Will need modifications to the BSC as per BM below. 
 
BALANCING MARKET  
Difficult for smaller generators to 
access the BM 
Modifications P344 & P355 ‘Introduction of a BM Lite Balancing 
Mechanism’ should be helpful in this respect. 
 
Lack of access for Aggregators & DSR Modification P344 brings the BSC in line with Project TERRE 
requirements which states that DSR should have a level playing field 
with other forms of generation in accessing the BM. Also, 
aggregators should be considered alongside P355 (although they are 
currently excluded). 
 
CAPACITY MARKET  
Access to the CM for RES RES receiving RO or CfD payments are ineligible to bid into the CM – 
which automatically rules out the majority of RES generation. 
 
Access to the CM for both DSR and 
Storage 
Although DSR and storage are accessing CM their respective share 
percentages are still very low. Decision to be made over whether their 
share % should be increased, or whether it is better to use these 
resources for real-time balancing of the system. 
 
Restrictions on the ability to stack 
revenues from ancillary services 
alongside CM 
Allow stacking of revenues between the CM and ancillary services. 
Review exclusivity clauses. 
 
Aggregators can’t change the 
portfolio of DSR participants which 
make up a CM unit. Therefore, if one 
participant withdraws the whole 
contract is nullified 
 
Enable asset reallocation by DSR providers. 
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By determining a strict reliability 
standard in advance this can lead to 
over-contracting of capacity, thereby 
limiting the scope for ancillary services 
(Reserve) to provide peak demand 
 
Reduce reliability standard and / or allow flexibility to provide real-
time balancing. 
The CM is keeping old plant in 
operation which will prove direct 
competition for local assets. 
BEIS / Ofgem need to consider what types of generation they are 
trying to encourage. With many contracts being awarded to existing 
fossil fueled plants they are prolonging the life of these generators to 
the detriment of flexibility providers. The CM Rules need to be 
amended to discourage this. 
 
The recent falling clearing prices of 
CM contracts (2018 auctions) is 
proving unattractive for storage 
providers 
 
As above – review CM Rules regarding old ‘dirty’ plant. 
By relying on the CM to manage 
future perceived problems it stifles 
investment and development of other 
low carbon solutions to the problem 
such as DSR, storage and demand 
reduction 
As above – review CM Rules regarding old ‘dirty’ plant. 
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4. CHANGING ROLES OF NETWORK OPERATORS 
SECTION OVERVIEW 
To further enable the transition from a top-down, one-way system to a more complex distributed 
network, the roles of key market actors will also need to evolve (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a). This section 
outlines the changes that are already in progress with the TSO and the DNOs and how these changes 
can potentially unlock new flexibility markets, such as Centrica’s LEM, at the distribution level.  
 
4.1 THE TRANSMISSION SYSTEM OPERATOR 
National Grid are in the process of reorganising their business to separate the role of the TSO within the 
National Grid Group (NGG), and to set up a new legally separate company (with a separate licence) to 
carry out its electricity system operator function within NGG (Ofgem, 2017d).  
In January 2017 Ofgem led a consultation on the ‘Future Arrangements for the ESO’ (Ofgem, 2017c) 
which was followed by a consultation response in August 2017  (Ofgem, 2017d) along with National 
Grid’s ‘Industry transformation: The changing role of the electricity System Operator’ (National Grid, 
2017a). 
Ofgem’s thoughts are that a more independent TSO should be able to work more closely with the 
DNOs to create a ‘whole system view’ and identify and help speed up connections for new generation 
(Ofgem, 2017d). But this all depends on how the roles and responsibilities between transmission and 
network operators unfold. The European Commission proposes through the ‘Winter Package’ 
(European Commission, 2016b) to strengthen the legislative framework for cooperation between DNOs 
and TSOs to ensure that all necessary information and data is shared in order to ensure cost-efficiency 
and secure operation of the networks (Hancher and Winters, 2017). 
As more distributed generation emerges the traditional distinction between transmission and 
distribution will become increasingly blurred. Currently distributed generation is considered as 
‘negative’ demand for transmission flows. However, as the percentage of generation increases at the 
distribution network level, this cannot continue to be perceived as negative. Rather it needs to be 
thought of as a positive asset for both the coordination and balancing of the distribution networks. This 
is a new role for both transmission and distribution operators. 
Elexon have stated that the blurring of the distinction between transmission and distribution could 
remove the concept of Grid Supply Points, as there would be no Transmission Grid to Distribution 
transition point. Elexon claim that the movement of settlement down towards individual consumer 
level, from the current Grid Supply Point level, would be a fundamental market change, which would 
act as a key enabler to many innovative ideas (Elexon, 2017a).  
However, an increase in the demand for balancing services will pose challenges for National Grid which 
has limited visibility of demand and distributed generation (Watson, Ekins and Wright, 2016). Therefore 
whilst the TSO may hope to remain at the forefront of electricity balancing as GB moves towards a 
more decentralised energy market (National Grid, 2017a) there is great potential for the switching of 
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roles in system balancing, with the distribution networks becoming increasingly more important 
(Nolan, 2015).  
National Grid’s ‘Industry Transformation’ document explains how the TSO sits at the ‘heart’ of the 
electricity system (National Grid, 2017a) and the document sets out four workstreams to enable the 
transition towards a distributed electricity future with the TSO still at the forefront of balancing supply 
and demand across the entire network. The workstreams are: 
• Flexibility – relooking at the procurement of ancillary / flexibility services to aid transparency and 
market entry (in line with the SNAPS document outlined in Section 3.2) 
• Network Competition – including working with the DNOs to identify distribution network 
solutions and non-traditional solutions (i.e. storage, DSR) where this proves to be cost-effective 
• Whole System – working with the DNOs on the Open Networks project (see Section 4.2) and other 
industry partners to trial different ways of buying and selling energy and services (such as the LEM). 
• Level Playing Field – working with Ofgem in reforming network charging and access arrangements 
for distributed energy providers (see Section 5). 
 
Whilst the TSO may wish to remain at the ‘heart’ of the electricity system in the near future, these four 
workstreams show that National Grid recognise that the way in which they currently operate will need 
to change. This should be beneficial to DER operators and the LEM as new routes to market should be 
facilitated and encouraged. However, it is unclear how much power the TSO will hold in the future and 
how far they are willing to help enable change and cooperate with potential rival organisations over 
access to data and potential sharing of operating platforms.  
It is possible that the role of the TSO could diminish to the point of managing low level baseload 
requirements and evening peaks only (Nolan, 2015). Ultimately it is for BEIS  and Ofgem to provide 
clarity on the future roles and responsibilities of the TSO and the DSOs by clearly defining these roles 
and responsibilities and through establishing an appropriate regulatory and incentives framework 
(Shakoor et al., 2017). BEIS and Ofgem therefore need to listen to a range of energy industry voices in 
defining this future rather than just the voices of the networks themselves as will be discussed in the 
next section. 
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4.2 THE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK OPERATORS 
The changing role of the DNOs can be seen as one of the most critical factors determining whether, and 
how, small generators and DER providers are able to access new revenue streams and localised 
markets. This section outlines the changes that are in progress and how these changes can unlock such 
markets. This section also highlights the work of the Open Networks Project in helping to create and 
establish the new roles and responsibilities between network operators, and the role of RIIO in 
financing the networks and stimulating network innovation through dedicated funding pots. 
FROM DNO TO DSO 
Until recently the DNOs have been seen as largely ‘passive’ in their operations – facilitating the one way 
flow of electricity to the consumer. However, an increase in distributed generation connected directly 
to these networks requires increasing enablement of bi-directional power flows, and the DNOs are now 
faced with a number of issues in network management, including increased occurrences of voltage 
deviations, line losses, protection sensitivity, system balancing and reserve issues (Ramos et al., 2016).  
To meet the needs of this more decentralised future energy system, the GB DNOs are beginning to 
commence a transition to becoming DSOs – distribution system operators – during the current RIIO-
ED1 price control period (2015-2023). The Energy Networks Association (ENA) has defined a DSO as: - 
• securely operating and developing an active distribution system comprising networks, demand, 
generation and other flexible distributed energy resources (DER) 
• acting as a neutral facilitator of an open and accessible market, enabling competitive access to 
markets and the optimal use of DER on distribution networks to deliver security, sustainability and 
affordability in the support of whole system optimisation 
• enabling customers to be both producers and consumers; enabling customer access, customer 
choice and great customer service (ENA, 2017b). 
The Energy Policy Group at the University of Exeter broadly agree with this definition5 in that it moves 
the DNO away from the passive role of ‘fit and forget’ (Ramos et al., 2016) and transforms their role 
into ‘active’ system coordinators (Bray et al., 2017). Although the European Commission proposes to 
strengthen the legislative framework for DSOs through the Winter Package, this is proving challenging 
as the DSOs current roles are divergent across all Member States (Hancher and Winters, 2017). In 
essence though, regulators need to ensure that all DSOs have adequate financial incentives to innovate 
and upgrade their networks, to procure and connect distributed generation and to contract with other 
service providers, as well as to deal with local congestion management issues (European Commission, 
2016a) and (Hancher and Winters, 2017).  In GB, the balance between what the DSOs will operate 
themselves and what they will procure from the market is still to be determined. New flexibility services 
                                                                    
5 Overall, however, the EPG prefers the Distribution Service Provider (DSP) function as set out by the IGov project and outlined 
here: http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/submission-comments-on-wpds-dso-transition-consultation-document/  
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will emerge over the next few years so the DSOs will need to anticipate and enable their route to 
market.  
This change should lead to wider procurement of distribution level services to manage local constraints 
and system balancing, creating new flexibility markets for local distributed energy providers to trade in. 
The Cornwall LEM is such a market at the distribution level, enabling network parties and DER to buy 
and sell flexibility services. 
The presence of flexibility markets, operating at the distribution network level and improving local 
balancing, may also enable additional renewable generators to connect to the network in locations 
which were previously considered to be constrained.  
 
THE ROLE OF THE OPEN NETWORKS PROJECT 
The ENA is leading on the ‘Open Networks Project’ which is examining DNO to DSO transitions as part 
of its remit, as well as advising on the future coordination scheme for the TSO and the DSOs in the 
procurement and dispatch of DER. The coordination scheme which is eventually chosen will not only 
determine the responsibilities of the system operators towards each other but will also determine their 
responsibilities towards third parties (i.e. suppliers, aggregators, DER providers etc.) (Hancher and 
Winters, 2017). This work is of strategic importance to the future of the GB energy system and it should 
therefore be questioned whether the ENA is the correct body to be leading on this. Although the 
network operators will have the technical experience and expertise to input to the project they also 
have a vested interest in the outcomes of the project through their current role as monopoly 
stakeholders. The project does also have input from BEIS, Ofgem, academics, trade associations and 
NGOs; giving the project a degree of legitimacy in decision making, but it should ultimately be for 
Government to determine the route which will best lead to the smart, flexible energy system required.  
Lessons could be learnt here from California and New York (as discussed further in Section 6.2) which 
are both well advanced in their energy transitions. New York State’s Reforming the Energy Vision, the 
New York REV (NYPDS, 2014), was launched in 2014 on the premise that the existing energy 
governance was no longer fit for purpose and had to be completely rewritten to create a decentralised 
energy system with a strong focus on distribution level services, operated through active Distribution 
Service Providers (DSPs).  The DSP is envisaged in New York as both the local System Operator and as 
the platform through which DER providers can sell to customers via new markets to create value for 
both customers and the system.  The DSP serves as a multi-way retail-level dispatcher to the grid 
(distribution and transmission) of both energy and system services,  supplied not only by traditional 
power plants, but also by a vastly expanded fleet of DER (Mitchell, 2016). 
Meanwhile in GB, the Open Networks project is investigating: what is the scope of activity that a DSO 
should carry out to manage constraints on the network; what should the role of the DSO be within the 
energy market; and how should this new entity interact with other market participants (ENA, 2017c)? 
The project is split across five workstreams see Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 Open Networks Workstreams 
 
Source: (ENA, 2017d) 
 
Workstream 1  (T-D Process) issued a consultation document in August 2017 ‘Commercial Principles for 
Contracted Flexibility’ (ENA, 2017d) which put forward six different models for coordinating the 
procurement and dispatch of DER services as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 ENA’s 6 Models for coordinating DER 
Option Assessment 
1. Status Quo (which is seen as 
unsustainable in the long term)   
 
Option 1 is recognised by the ENA as not being a viable long term 
solution if GB moves to a more flexible energy system.  
2. Managing Distribution Network 
Impact - similar to Status Quo but 
with a direct link to the DSO so 
that impact can be understood 
 
Option 2 is a slight enhancement on Option 1 in that it incorporates 
the provision of DER on distribution networks, but it is procured only 
by the SO. This will have the effect of reducing the amount of services 
that local assets can offer and does not overcome network constraint 
management issues or provide for local granularity. 
 
3. SO coordinates – procuring for 
the needs of SO and DSO 
 
Option 3 may be the most conventional model in the shorter term 
due to the SOs existing procurement, call-off and settlement 
processes already being in place. It also means that one organisation 
is procuring / dispatching on a nationwide basis, rather than 6 DSOs 
procuring separately for their own needs. However it is still a top 
down approach and may not include the granularity anticipated for 
full DER market availability. 
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4. DSO coordinates – procuring for 
the needs of SO and DSO 
 
Option 4 appears to be the most complex model to implement as it 
would entail the DSOs managing the entire GB network, which they 
currently have no visibility of. Systems would need to be put in place 
to ensure smooth transactions between the DSOs and the SO, but 
the DSOs should be in a better position to understand their own areas 
needs and constraints and this model would achieve granularity at 
the local level. 
5. Joint procurement and / or 
dispatch – possibly through the 
use of a third party 
 
Option 5 is also complex and potentially more difficult for small DER 
providers to understand and participate in. However, Option 5 would 
appear to be the most innovative and effective model longer term 
once the operating platform between the DSO and SO is established 
as this model should best enable local assets to access multiple 
markets. 
6. Parallel DER routes to market – 
DSO-led approach alongside 
DERs and aggregators offering 
services directly to SO. Includes 
DSO acting as a commercial 
aggregator 
 
 
Option 6 could be more burdensome for DER providers, with 
potentially conflicting contract offers. Option 6 would not enable 
broader procurement synergies to be realised at the D & T levels 
where the SO procures directly from DER or via independent 
aggregators. The aspect of DSOs acting as commercial aggregators 
though raises concerns relating to market fairness and letting the 
market decide. 
 
The ENA also produced a ‘DSO Roadmap to 2030’ under Workstream 3 in 2017 (ENA, 2017a) which sets 
out the expectations on what can be delivered by the DNOs by the end of ED-1 (2023) and then by 
almost the end of ED-2 (which is currently due to end in 20316). As can be seen in Figure 4 the ENA 
expect some network areas to be operating as regional DSOs at some point during the ED-2 time 
frame. This fits with WPDs ambitions to be ‘market ready’ by 2023 and operating as a DSO from the 
start of ED-2. However the ENAs expectation is that not all DNOs will have made the transition to DSO 
status until the end of ED-27. This delay could have a serious effect on the rollout of local energy 
markets across GB in the next ten years and could potentially cause a bias in favour of the TSO 
continuing to co-ordinate balancing services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
6 ED-2 could be reduced to five years instead of eight in light of March 2018 consultation on RIIO-2 
7 Interview with networks expert on 01/11/17 
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Figure 4 The ENA’s DSO Roadmap to 2030 
 
Source: Energy Networks Association website: http://www.energynetworks.org 
 
However, the Roadmap is iterative and changes could be made within the next few years, including 
changes to what the future role of the DSO (if any) should be within the energy system. This could take 
account of recommendations made in Dieter Helm’s ‘Cost of Energy Review’ (Helm, 2017) which 
advocated Regional System Operators or indeed a completely new model. In this respect WPD have 
signaled that they will be ‘market ready’ by 2023 with the expectation that future roles and 
relationships will have been determined by that point.  The ENA recognise that any future 
arrangements would need to be compatible with the directions of BEIS and Ofgem and also with 
relevant European legislation in the Winter Package (European Commission, 2016b). In addition, 
system coordination between transmission and distribution would need to be incorporated into the 
emerging Project TERRE (discussed in Section 3.4). 
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Finally, there is concern over whether the Open Networks project will be able to produce any tangible 
outcomes,8 as follows: 
• The project is being led by the ENA but it is for BEIS & Ofgem to set the regulatory direction - 
although Government can be guided towards an end result they are not required to implement it 
and could indeed seek an alternative model. 
• There will inevitably be conflict between the newly standalone SO and DNO/DSOs whilst they 
carve out their new roles and responsibilities and seek to protect their own interests. 
• Not all the DNOs wish to transform into DSOs – due to both network concerns and shareholder 
priorities. As all DNOs are represented on the project could this influence the outcomes / decisions 
made? 
• Would those outcomes have been different if the Project included more industry representation or 
had been led by a neutral third party? 
 
 
RIIO 
The current price control for electricity networks, RIIO-ED1, runs for 8 years from 2015-2023. Each DNO 
is allowed a ‘base revenue’ after a business plan and its costs are agreed. The base revenue is the 
amount of money the DNO is allowed to spend, and recoup from customers, to meet the agreed 
outputs of the Business Plan (Poulter, 2017). The revenue is mainly recovered from the electricity 
suppliers who use the networks to distribute energy to their customers. Revenue is collected through 
the application of Distribution Use of System (DUoS) tariffs.  These charges are then recovered from 
end users as part of their total energy bill (see Section 5 which should be read in light of the RIIO 
framework for setting revenues). 
A key intent of RIIO was the incorporation of innovation into network operations. The main driver for 
this was the move away from a Regulatory Asset Value (RAV) based on capex / opex  with the creation 
of a single total expenditure category (totex) (Lockwood, 2014). Under ED-1 instead of additions to the 
RAV being made on the basis of actual capex they are now deemed to be 70% of allowed totex.  
This move to totex should incentivise DNOs to identify the cheapest network solutions regardless of 
the opex / capex make-up (ibid). This change should greatly benefit local generators /DSR providers 
(such as the Cornwall LEM participants) where they can demonstrate that local flexibility services offer 
a cheaper NWA solution to the DNO in overcoming local constraints, rather than the DNO being 
incentivised towards a capex solution such as building a bigger network. 
Innovation also became directly funded in RIIO through the Network Innovation Allowance (NIA) and 
the Network Innovation Competition (NIC). Together these two schemes fund DNOs to conduct 
research and run network-related trial projects for transitioning to a low carbon economy. NIA is 
awarded on a use-it-or-lose-it basis based as a percentage of base revenue to fund smaller research, 
development and demonstration projects; whereas NIC is awarded as part of an annual competition for 
large-scale projects (Poulter, 2017).  
                                                                    
8 Interview with networks expert 1 on 03/10/17 
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One of the criticisms of the innovation funding regime is that very few projects delivered have actually 
been rolled out as business-as-usual (BAU) (Poulter et al., 2017). However, by including innovation as an 
output rather than a separate pot this could encourage DNOs to implement innovative solutions more 
widely (ibid).  
WPD have recently been awarded NIC funding of £2.9M for the Electricity Flexibility and Forecasting 
System (EFFS) which will build and test new network software to improve network load forecasting and 
identify opportunities for the buying and selling of flexibility services (Ofgem, 2017f). This is the 
software that will inform WPDs bids on the Cornwall LEM and should become BAU across the DNOs 
after the trial period if proven successful. 
PRICE REVIEW (RIIO-2) 
Reviewing the current price controls, Ofgem concluded that there are many positive aspects to RIIO, 
such as the focus on delivering outputs for consumers, and supporting innovation and incentives to 
encourage companies to plan for the long term. However, noting that the majority of network 
companies are delivering strong earnings towards the top end of its expectations in each sector, Ofgem 
signalled that companies need to prepare themselves for tougher price controls from 2021 (RIIO-2) 
(Ofgem, 2017i).  
Ofgem’s Senior Partner for Networks, Jonathan Brearley, also confirmed on 1 November 2017 
(Brearley, 2017) that there are still questions for Ofgem to resolve around: 
• The timing and length of price controls - is 8 years an appropriate timescale? 
• How to achieve fair returns 
• Business Plans – should they be fast tracked? How best should costs be assessed? 
• Innovation – how should this be simplified and mainstreamed (so it’s not just an add-on). 
The University of Exeter’s Energy Policy Group (EPG) submitted a response to Ofgem which questioned 
whether the length of price controls is appropriate (they consider eight years to be too long) and 
whether timeframes should be aligned with those for transmission (i.e. 2021 not 2023) (Poulter et al., 
2017). The counter argument to this though is that eight years gives DNOs a long enough timeframe to 
plan and implement new projects with more certainty. And whilst from a policy perspective it might 
make sense to align with transmission, there is no real advantage to the monies aligning9. 
The EPG also stated that more needs to be done to enable flexibility and to deliver innovation projects 
which bring about a real change in practices, not just BAU (ibid).  
Ofgem released a RIIO-2 Framework Consultation document in March 2018 (Ofgem, 2018b) which 
proposes that the length of the price controls are reduced to five years but that highlights that there are 
more disadvantages to aligning the timescales than to keeping them separate, with perhaps the main 
disadvantage being the enormous workload constraint for the industry given the size of the electricity 
distribution price control compared to the other price controls. 
                                                                    
9 Interview with networks expert 3 on 16/01/18 
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Ofgem also proposed potential new mechanisms to ensure fair returns, including a hard cap and floor 
to restrict returns from rising or falling below a pre-determined level. They also agreed that innovation 
should be more of an integral part of the process with outputs which become the new BAU. One 
proposal for achieving this is to extend funding out to third party competition where it is believed that 
new market-based models could provide better value for consumers and facilitate whole system 
solutions. 
 
REGULATORY AND MARKET BARRIERS TO LEMS  
There are several barriers to local energy markets as shown in Table 4, not least being the issue that 
there are many factors yet to be determined, as is the timescale for transition.  
This uncertainty for the DNO/DSO also provides uncertainty for the LEM, particularly in relation to 
what services the DSO will be procuring from the market and what they will be managing themselves 
as the operator. Clarification is therefore needed regarding DSO activities to ensure a competitive 
marketplace.  In this respect BEIS have already stated that DSOs shouldn’t own storage facilities as that 
would be uncompetitive (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a). However, through current DNO implementation of 
active network management (ANM) - which is intended to be implemented across all WPDs networks – 
the DNO/DSO are able to curtail generation themselves, rather than procure market solutions for 
flexibility. This undermines the value in market-based flexibility services, and leads to uncertainty for 
generators both in terms of operability and finance. 
In WPD’s  DSO Strategy document (WPD, 2017a) they set out a range of operations that can be utilised 
by the DSO to manage system flexibility themselves (Automated Load Transfer; Dynamic Asset Rating; 
Voltage Reduction; ANM; Intertrip Connections; Timed Connections and Export / Import Limited 
Connections). Although these are recognised system management tools, the extent to which these 
tools are deployed will have the potential to limit the availability of market solutions provided by the 
LEM in overcoming constraints. 
Currently DNOs are able to earn up to 1% of revenue from de minimis reward services. Under this 
arrangement Electricity North West are aiming to bid Project CLASS (Customer Load Active System 
Services) into the ancillary services market. CLASS was originally a Low Carbon Network Funded 
project to manage peak electricity demand through frequency response and voltage control (Cox, 2017) 
but due to its success this has now become a revenue stream for the DNO (albeit they are likely to reach 
their 1% revenue limit fairly on in the trial and there are caveats in place by Ofgem)10.  However this 
concept undermines market competition and raises many questions on the extent and control of DSOs 
in the market place. 
The barriers listed in Table 4 below are mostly in relation to WPD as the Cornwall LEM will be operating 
within this network area, and all references are taken from WPDs ‘DSO Transition Strategy’ published 
in December 2017 (WPD, 2017a) after consultation was held earlier that year. 
 
                                                                    
10 Electricity North West obtained a derogation from Ofgem to trial the trading of this service to the TSO  
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Table 4 Network Barriers to LEMS 
Theme Barrier Possible Solution 
Timescale for 
transition & 
willingness of 
DNOs for 
change 
There is no set timescale for DNOs 
to transition to becoming DSOs.  
Not all DNOs appear to want to 
change or feel the need to change 
their operations. 
 
WPD are actively working towards transition to DSO 
status.  
WPD have committed to establishing their DSO role 
by the end of ED-1 (2023) but this is not the case for 
all DNOs. And indeed, WPDs position is to be ‘market 
ready’ by 2023, anticipating that most of the DSO 
functions will come online during RIIO-2 (2023-2031). 
WPD will undertake an over-arching ‘DSO Transition 
Programme’ to lead this work. 
BEIS / Ofgem should set a timescale for all DNOs to 
commit to. 
Coordination 
with TSO 
Ambiguities as set out in the Open 
Networks Project about who 
should lead and coordinate on 
procurement of balancing services 
in future as distributed generation 
grows. 
WPD would prefer to move to one of the DSO-led 
models identified in the Open Networks Project (see 
Table 4), presumably Option 4 or 6 as they claim the 
DSO-led models ‘will result in the most efficient 
whole system outcome’.  
Either of those options should be beneficial to LEMs 
as these both have a wide role for the operation of 
DER. There may be market conflicts though in Option 
6 with the role of the DSO as a commercial 
aggregator, which need to be assessed. 
WPD recognise that data sharing with the TSO will be 
critical to optimising the network. 
 
DSO visibility of 
the network 
DNOs currently only have limited 
visibility down to 33kV asset level 
with no visibility below this. They 
also have no real understanding of 
the amount of DER operational on 
the network at the street / 
household level. 
WPD have signaled that they will primarily deploy 
supporting infrastructure on the EHV network down 
to the 33kV asset level before increasing visibility at 
LV levels. UoE have responded to WPD that they 
don’t agree with this stance as DER and DSR will 
continue to develop across all levels of the network. 
Even if it is not realistic to upgrade the whole network 
at the moment then it would make sense to take one 
part of the network (like Cornwall with current high 
constraints) and upgrade the visibility and control 
across all voltage levels early on in the DSO process to 
provide some vital learning for later stages of the 
transformation (Bray et al., 2017).  
    EPG    36 
 
Balancing / 
Forecasting 
Enhanced sensing with active 
technical and commercial 
mechanisms is required. 
WPD will develop a platform (Project EFFS) to provide 
visibility, warn of critical peak price periods and take 
offers of flexibility services.  
Market services There is uncertainty over how 
many services the DSOs will be 
procuring from distribution 
markets and how many services 
they can operate themselves.  
 
WPD have indicated that these are likely to be reserve 
services for real power and voltage control (such as 
Flexible Power) rather than fast acting products such 
as frequency response. 
WPD have signaled that secondary trading markets 
such as the P2P market may be created for DER 
providers. 
WPD have stated that they will use a mixture of 
tenders and market based arrangements for 
procurement of services. 
However, there is still uncertainty over how much 
flexibility WPD will procure at this stage. 
NWA DSOs should be encouraged to 
seek NWAs where this can be 
achieved at lower cost than 
reinforcement. RIIO helps in this 
effect, with a shift to RAV from 
totex rather than capex. 
More acknowledgement needed of the value of 
network savings that could be achieved through 
deferment of network upgrades and potential 
recompense to those providing these NWA solutions. 
WPD have signaled that they will seek NWA from 
DSR and flexibility providers where issues can be 
solved for a lower total cost than reinforcing the 
network. 
Decisions will be taken in ‘investment decision 
timescales’ to reduce, defer or negate conventional 
build. These timescales will presumably correspond to 
RIIO timescales. 
DNOs should include in their Business Plans how they 
will include NWAs and the types of suitable projects 
which will be considered along with timescales for 
implementation. 
 
Connections  Alternative connections such as 
ANM, Timed, Soft-Intertrip and 
Export Limited in CMZ are 
enabling more connections to be 
made to the network, but these 
come with penalties (such as LIFO) 
which undermine the operational 
capacity and financial viability of 
DER.  
One solution used by DNOs is active network 
management (ANM) in Constraint Managed Zones 
(CMZ) which allows a new generator to connect 
within the zone for a quicker connection with a lower 
connection fee, in exchange for the DNO being able 
to curtail generation at times of system stress. This is 
a financially competitive solution for the DNOs as 
they still receive a connection fee and they can avoid 
network reinforcement costs by curtailing generation 
instead of upgrading the network. However, it incurs 
financial risk and uncertainty to the generator as the 
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WPD are extending these products 
to all WPD areas and will include 
demand and storage connections. 
DNOs can curtail generation themselves, rather than 
procure market solutions for flexibility, thus 
undermining the value in market-based flexibility 
services.  
Curtailment also often means that it is the renewable 
generation which is turned off first in the LIFO queue, 
undermining national targets and causing higher 
power prices. 
Therefore ANM is not a good long-term solution to 
achieving a smart and flexible energy market at the 
distribution level. 
The issue of connections is being raised through the 
Charging Futures work (see Section 5) which could 
either have a positive or negative effect on future 
connection arrangements depending on the model 
chosen. In addition, WPD have committed to creating 
a localised visibility platform (which will be publicly 
available) to demonstrate where there is congestion / 
capacity on the network. 
 
Stacking of 
services 
Stacking of revenues needed 
across DSO services and ancillary 
services to ensure viability. 
WPD have signaled that they will be open to stacking 
of services in order to allow customers to participate 
in transmission and distribution level markets. 
 
RIIO RIIO still gives network operators 
the ability to ‘game’ the system in 
setting their revenues and 
innovation projects have to date 
been seen as add-ons rather than 
BAU.  
The move to totex is welcomed but innovative 
solutions need to be seen as business as usual, not 
interesting add-ons with no long-term benefits to 
customers.  
RIIO-2 should therefore provide price controls which 
encourage active participation in the DSO transition 
and seek flexible solutions to network management. 
Clarification needs to be made as to whether the DSO 
transition costs will come out of RIIO-2 revenues (and 
therefore paid for by customers through network 
charging) or whether there should be a separate pot 
to fund this.   
The way in which the networks set their revenues has 
a huge implication on network charging as discussed 
in Section 5 which will have an impact on consumer 
behaviour. 
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Network 
Charges 
WPD acknowledge that stronger 
locational signals for distribution 
network charges will have an effect 
on the siting of additional DER 
providers. 
Network charges are currently being reviewed 
through the Charging Futures work being undertaken 
by Ofgem (see Section 5). 
Storage Ambiguities over whether DNOS 
should own / operate storage – 
which would be uncompetitive to 
flexibility providers. 
Ofgem signaled that DNOs shouldn’t own / operate 
storage as it is uncompetitive to the market. UKPN 
and Northern Powergrid however have argued 
against this. WPDs position is that storage owned / 
operated by DNOs should only be used as a ‘last 
resort’ if the market fails to deliver. 
Source: (WPD, 2017b) 
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SECTION SUMMARY 
As more power is connected at the distribution level this will have a major impact on the current and 
future roles of  the TSO and the DNOs (WPD, 2017b), with the DNOs potentially becoming major 
operators in procurement of services and system balancing in future (Nolan, 2015) rather than the TSO 
as happens currently. 
The TSO and the DNOs are therefore in the process of realigning their core businesses to better engage 
with this more distributed energy future. This is a positive step, but it will entail a period of uncertainty 
whilst their new roles and responsibilities are established. Therefore, communication between the 
system operators will be essential to outline rights and responsibilities of all actors involved in 
maintaining system balance (Ramos et al., 2016). To this effect the ENAs work on the Open Networks 
Project will prove invaluable, not least because it brings all system operators together under one forum 
to discuss the issues involved. 
However, BEIS are under no obligation to implement the outcomes from the Open Networks Project 
and could wish to implement a completely different model, such as that advocated by Dieter Helm. And 
whilst BEIS is currently stating that it wants a smart and flexible energy system (BEIS and Ofgem, 
2017a), it is not stating how it wants that to happen and by when (Bray et al., 2017). Instead it seems to 
be leaving these difficult decisions to be determined by the actors themselves. 
The coordination scheme which is eventually chosen will not only determine the responsibilities of the 
system operators towards each other but will also determine their responsibilities towards third parties 
(i.e. suppliers, aggregators, DER providers etc.) (Hancher and Winters, 2017). The new roles, and the 
new services that will be procured by system operators, therefore will have a major impact on the scale, 
role and viability of local energy markets and so it should be questioned whether the ENA is the correct 
body to be leading on this scheme. Much can be learnt through ‘trying by doing’ and industry have a 
role to play here as well as the network operators in shaping future outcomes. 
RIIO has been helpful in the move from capex to totex in defining the asset value of networks. RIIO-2 
should go further though in incentivising DNOs to complete their DSO transitions and to seek cheaper 
market solutions to network capacity issues. There is a need for networks to engage fully in this process 
and to actively seek to support flexibility markets within their network areas. 
WPD are forging ahead with their ambition to be market ready by 2023. This is welcomed but there is 
still much to be determined, learnt and overcome within the next few years. 
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5. CHANGES TO NETWORK CHARGES AND ACCESS RIGHTS 
SECTION OVERVIEW 
At present all users of the GB electricity networks pay to use them in some way. Generators use the 
networks to transport their electricity to where it is needed whilst demand users use the networks to 
consume electricity when they need it. 
However, Ofgem are now considering whether the current system of network charging is still 
appropriate  and ‘fair’ to all users given higher volumes of generation connected at the distribution 
level; behind the meter technologies and opportunities for prosumers to reduce their network usage 
(thus their network charges) whilst still having the reliability of the networks available at all times.  
Ofgem are also looking at connection and access rights as part of these reviews, which are all bannered 
under the ‘Charging Futures Forum’ work. 
Several proposals have been put forward by Ofgem regarding a way forward, but these haven’t been 
subject to impact assessment at this stage. The models identified have varying incentives / 
disincentives for DER and flexibility providers as well as prosumers. 
 
CURRENT CHARGING REGIME 
Users of the networks pay for use of the distribution and transmission networks through four charges:  
• Connection charge 
• Transmission Network Use of System charge (TNUoS) 
• Distribution Use of System charge (DUoS) 
• Balancing Services Use of System charge (BSUoS) 
 
Charges are calculated according to the charging methodology in two industry codes: 
• TNUoS, BSUoS and transmission connection charging methodology can be found in 
the Connection and Use of System code (CUSC). 
• DUoS and distribution connection charging methodology can be found in the Distribution 
Connection Use of System Agreement (DCUSA). 
 
System charges include ‘forward-looking’ charges and ‘residual’ charges which are top-up charges set 
to ensure that total allowed revenues are recovered: - 
• Forward-looking charges reflect current and forward-looking costs associated with generating or 
consuming energy. For some users these can vary by location on the network, or by time of 
use. These charges reflect the marginal cost of the networks in the long run (the cost of adding 
each additional unit of capacity on the networks) 
 
• Residual charges don’t cover specific things, but are broadly used to recover sunk or fixed costs. 
These costs don’t vary with network usage, and largely relate to costs that have already been 
incurred, such as past investments. Residual charges represent around 80% of revenues at 
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transmission level and around 50% at distribution level (CMS, 2017) and (Ofgem, 2017n). In 
addition, Balancing System Use of System (BSUoS) charges are currently a form of cost-recovery 
charge, so are similar to residual charges (Ofgem, 2017p). 
 
RESIDUAL CHARGES 
Ofgem launched a Targeted Charging Review - Significant Code Review in August 2017  (Ofgem, 2017p) 
to review the current charging regime of residual charges to ensure that all consumers who use the 
networks pay an appropriate share. 
Ofgem explained that the current residual charging regime was designed for a system with passive 
demand and large-scale, centrally-dispatched power stations; while today’s power systems are 
becoming more decentralised and responsive. The increased availability of smaller scale generation, 
private wire networks, and storage means that some consumers may more easily reduce net demand or 
peak net demand (by using generation and storage behind the meter). Therefore, users who don’t have 
these technologies will bear a higher burden of the residual charges. This has been termed the ‘death 
spiral’ effect -as more customers go off grid, the network costs for those remaining will rise – increasing 
the incentive for others to leave as well   (Lacey, 2014) (Nolan, 2015). 
Ofgem then published a working paper on residual charges in November 2017 (Ofgem, 2017o). The 
document outlines seven different mechanisms for setting residual charges, but then discounts several 
of them as inappropriate; leaving proposals for fixed charges (per user), ex-ante capacity demand, ex-
post capacity demand and gross consumption charges (business customers only). Of these the only 
ones which would reward prosumers for their actions are the ex-ante and ex-post capacity demand 
charges as shown in Table 5. 
Ofgem will be conducting a draft impact assessment on the proposed charging arrangements in early 
2018 with the findings due to be published in the second quarter of 2018. But BEIS / Ofgem need to 
consider what type of customer behaviour they are wanting to incentivise / disincentivise through 
adopting any new methodology.  
Table 5 Residual Charging Mechanism Proposals 
Option / Mechanism Carried 
Forward 
Thoughts  
Net at meter volumetric charges No Current system – discounted by Ofgem as the way forward 
as likely to result in inefficient network use. Concerns are 
that customers with BTM technologies can have the back-
up reliability of the network but pay little towards overall 
network costs. 
Fixed demand charge (per user) Yes This would be a fixed charge per user based on different 
user profile classes. This option is the simplest proposal to 
be carried forward but is likely to be viewed as ‘unfair’ from 
a prosumer view as it doesn’t relate to actual access of the 
network and could lead to more prosumers disconnecting 
from the network. Fixed charges provide more revenue 
certainty for networks, but can lead to overcharging of all 
consumers and does nothing to incentivise consumer 
behaviour. 
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Ex-ante capacity demand charges Yes Charge would be based on a user’s agreed or connected 
capacity, with possibly an initial ‘capacity block’ charge at a 
lower rate with any additional capacity charged at a higher 
rate. This could lead to more efficient network planning as 
capacity requirements would be known in advance, and 
would disincentivise customers from exceeding their 
capacity limit. However, this could be unfair to heat pump 
and EV customers who have chosen electric over fossil fuel 
alternatives but who will therefore have a higher usage. 
Ex-post capacity demand charges Yes This would be based on peak use, charged based on user’s 
own highest usage half-hours over a defined period (not on 
system peaks). This mechanism would incentivise 
consumer behaviour in the same way as triad avoidance. 
Gross volumetric consumption 
charges 
Partially Ofgem have discounted this as a route for domestic 
customers, but are analysing the option for business 
customers. 
Net volumetric import and export 
charges 
No Ofgem have discounted this option as they propose that 
residual costs should be on final demand, not on 
generation (export) but state that this may be more 
appropriate for forward-looking charges. 
Max peak import or export capacity 
charges 
No This option would charge users for the maximum import or 
export capacity requirement. Ofgem have discounted this 
option as they propose that residual costs should be on 
final demand, not on generation (export) and because it 
would disincentivise prosumers to have any export 
capacity. 
Source: (Ofgem, 2017o) 
 
EMBEDDED BENEFITS 
Ofgem also believe that the current network charging regime has distorted the playing field between 
generation that connects to the transmission network and generation that connects to the distribution 
network - with distribution level generation given a competitive advantage (Ofgem, 2017m p.52). As a 
result, Ofgem also took the decision to cut the amount of embedded benefits paid to DER providers 
through two changes to the CUSC, Modification Proposals CMP264 and 265. 
Embedded benefits (EB) are payments that are made to generators attached to the distribution 
network, as opposed to the transmission network, so called because these generators are ‘embedded’ 
further down the system closer to sources of electricity demand. EB are based on the contribution 
made by embedded generators to reducing demands on the transmission network, especially during 
the three half-hours with highest demand in the year (the Triad). 
Ofgem approved a large cut in the residual element of EB as part of the Significant Code Review on 
residual charging, effectively taking EB from a current value of £47.30 per kW of capacity to less than £2 
per kW over a three-year phase-in period from April 2018. Ofgem faced a judicial review on this 
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decision in January 2018, which was brought jointly by eight small generating companies, which Ofgem 
successfully overcame. 
Cornwall Insights remarked that ‘this is one of the worst decisions we have seen from the regulator’ and 
went on to explain that in their view Ofgem had underestimated the impact of this change on the 
economic viability of certain embedded units in its modelling assessment at the risk of triggering 
capital flight from certain parts of this market (Cornwall, 2017). 
The decision to uphold CUSC Modification Proposals 264 and 265 provides a strong incentive to invest 
in DSR, at the expense of local generation, or alternatively to site generation behind the meter – albeit 
even BTM is under threat from the TCR. 
 
FORWARD-LOOKING CHARGES AND ACCESS RIGHTS 
During the TCR process it was argued that Ofgem should review the whole of network charging 
holistically instead of reviewing residual charges in isolation. This led to Ofgem publishing a working 
paper on forward-looking charges and access rights in November 2017 (Ofgem, 2017k). Whilst it makes 
sense to look at network charges as a whole, these two consultations are still being developed 
separately (albeit under a joint Charging Futures Forum banner), which makes the overall assumption 
that there will still be a split between forward looking charges and residual charges rather than 
adopting a new, more holistic approach. 
The ‘Reform of electricity network access and forward-looking charges’ paper  (Ofgem, 2017k) looks at 
future access rights to network connections and considers how to make more choice in gaining access 
rights, rather than relying on a first come first served basis which can lead to long queues in gaining 
connections – options include being able to buy access for a specified length of time, or the right to be 
able to trade only within a specified local area, or being able to trade connection agreements between 
parties. Another option is to introduce auctions for access rights.  
There are almost no examples given within the document of these differing scenarios and it is very 
unclear what the individual proposals would constitute and what their implications would be. It will 
therefore be imperative to keep track on progression throughout 2018 and to provide Ofgem with 
consideration as to how local arrangements like the LEM can help to overcome network constraints 
within a geographical area by optimising trading to overcome traditional barriers. Ofgem have also 
discounted the option of Locational Marginal Pricing in the review which could also aid in optimising 
trading to overcome network constraints (see Section 6.6). 
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LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIA 
How to develop and pay for networks in an energy world of increasing proportions of onsite electricity 
generation has already become a central challenge in Australia. However their approach to dealing with 
this challenge has been markedly different to Ofgem’s. 
A report from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT, 2016) highlighted the possibility and 
consequences of ‘grid defection’, caused either by physical conditions such as the ability to install 
embedded generation within a residence or business, or by economic considerations such as the desire 
to avoid network costs: 
Regulators and policy-makers must carefully monitor for conditions that could lead to a serious 
threat of inefficient grid defection. If these conditions arise, regulators and policymakers must 
reconsider the costs that are included in the tariff as well as other measures to prevent substantial 
cross-subsidization among consumers and a potential massive grid defection with unforeseen 
consequences (MIT, 2016). 
This is the ‘death spiral’ effect mentioned above. The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) 
recognised the need for adjustments to network tariffs due to the high risk of grid defection (AEMC, 
2016a) which was followed by changes to the National Electricity Rules. The AEMC embraced the need 
for the energy market to ‘evolve’ and devised key enablers to incentivise the uptake of DER within the 
distribution network (AEMC, 2016b) including: 
 
• Cost-reflective distribution network tariffs: developing prices that better reflect the costs of 
network services 
• Network support payments: embedded generators are eligible for payments from networks in 
recognition of the benefits provided by delaying or avoiding investment in the network 
• Regulatory investment tests for distribution/transmission: require networks to consider the costs 
and benefits of all credible network and non-network solutions  
• Distribution network planning and expansion framework: annually plan and report on activities that 
are expected to have a material impact on the network in a distribution annual planning report, and 
to publish a demand-side engagement strategy 
• The capital expenditure sharing scheme and the efficiency benefit sharing scheme   
• The demand management incentive scheme and allowance to provide incentives and funding to 
invest in non-network solutions 
 
The AEMC consider the implementation of these network pricing reforms to be ‘the essential 
foundation to support energy market transformation’ (AEMC, 2018) and  are conducting annual reviews 
as of 2017 into the effectiveness of the policy (2017 review information not available until March 2018). 
The difference to the GB approach to reviewing network charging is vast. Whilst the AEMC embraced 
the need for the market to evolve and actively sought to incentivise the uptake of DER, Ofgem have 
taken a far more precautionary approach; treating the issue of network charges as a self-contained 
issue without, apparently, considering the wider consequences on the energy market. 
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SECTION SUMMARY 
The Charging Futures Forum consultations are still ongoing, and so no final verdict on its effectiveness 
can be drawn at this stage. However, there is much cause for concern. 
Ofgem have said that they are taking an ‘agnostic’ approach to network charges, believing that the cost 
of the network is separate from ‘policy aims’11 but this can be seen as a short sighted approach which 
has the potential to harm the ambitions of the Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan (discussed in Section 
6) and the Clean Growth Strategy (BEIS, 2017) through limiting the uptake of DER.  
Ofgem’s decision to maintain the separation between future costs and residual costs from the 
beginning is also disappointing. Network charging is a complex, iterative and dynamic process which is 
all the more important at this time of energy technology, system operation and economic change and 
as such, maintaining the ‘old’ two-tier system of network charging, while so much else changes, is a 
wasted opportunity to create a system which rewards customers for their behaviour change, such as 
has been created in Australia. 
Whatever system of network charging is finally decided upon will have a large impact on the way in 
which network operators recover their income and as such should be fully thought through and costed 
before the next round of RIIO funding is finalised. 
 
Table 6 Changes to Network Charging 
Barrier Possible Solution 
Targeted Charging Review – residual charges 
Any changes to the existing charging regime will have 
a potential impact on how prosumers will use the 
network in future. Whilst it may be sensible to make 
these customers pay a fair charge for their ability to 
rely on the network this should be done in a way 
which still incentivises prosumers for their positive 
actions. 
BEIS / Ofgem need to need to consider what type of 
customer behaviour they are wanting to incentivise / 
disincentivise through adopting any new 
methodology. Currently only the ex-ante and ex-post 
capacity demand charges option reward prosumers 
for their behaviour. 
Keep a watching brief on developments on this in 
2018 and engage in consultation events. 
Forward looking charges and access rights 
Details are very sketchy at the moment but could 
have widespread implications for connections 
Keep a watching brief on developments on this in 
2018 and engage in consultation events. 
Embedded Benefits – the slashing of EB will have a 
major negative effect on the revenue of small scale 
generators 
This retrograde decision has already been made and 
will implemented from April 2018, despite Ofgem 
facing a judicial review in January 2018. 
  
                                                                    
11 Advice from a Charging Futures Panel member 
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Part 2 POSSIBLE MARKET CHANGES 
6. OPENING UP NEW FLEXIBILITY MARKETS 
SECTION OVERVIEW 
Since privatisation at the end of the 1980s the GB electricity system has been a large, centralised 
system dominated by incumbents (Mitchell, 2014) with power flowing one-way from centralised 
generation through the transmission and distribution networks  through to end consumers. However, 
this traditional system, is now in the midst of transformation to a much more decentralised system with 
two-way power flows from distributed energy resources (DER) and renewable technologies (Ramos et 
al., 2016).  
As system flexibility will be the key enabler in delivering this transformation (Shakoor et al., 2017) 
Government need to ensure that flexibility markets are made more accessible for small energy 
providers, by removing regulatory barriers, and ensuring value for flexibility.  
BEIS has recognised the importance of flexibility in the electricity system and following on from their 
Call for Evidence (CfE) in late 2016 (BEIS and Ofgem, 2016), BEIS and Ofgem published the Smart 
Systems and Flexibility Plan in July 2017 (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a). The plan identified 29 actions for 
removing regulatory barriers to existing markets and opening up new flexibility markets, as 
summarised in Figure 5. Most of these actions are identified in this section, whilst the remaining actions 
(regarding access to existing markets) have already been discussed in Section 3. 
Figure 5 The Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan Actions 
 
Source: (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a) 
The main technologies for unlocking flexibility at the local level will be the implementation of demand 
side response (DSR) and energy storage utilised in conjunction with DER; as well as developments in 
smart metering, IT platforms and data sharing. Their establishment is vital to the development of new 
local flexibility markets, such as the LEM and enable more DER providers to connect to the network. 
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6.1 THE ROLE OF SMART METERS 
The rollout of smart meters to domestic properties and smaller businesses could provide a platform for 
energy system transformation (Connor et al., 2014) and will be an essential requirement for LEM 
customers in being able to trade their electricity, as smart meters are crucial for the accurate 
measurement of consumption patterns (Vallés et al., 2016) and for setting a baseline between the 
buyer and the seller in order to establish a proper valuation of transactions (Good et al., 2017). 
The EU’s Smart Meter Rollout Directive (2009/72/EC) mandates that all member states should achieve 
at least an 80% rollout of smart metering by 2020. The UKs smart meter rollout programme should 
bring the UK into compliance with this directive (Warren, 2014) and (Connor et al., 2014), although 
there have been delays, ICT, communications and installation issues to date (Shakoor et al., 2017) as 
shown in Table 7 which will cause an ongoing risk to the wider establishment of LEMs until they have 
been resolved.  
Table 7 Issues with Smart Meter Rollout Programme 
Programme delays – the delay in rollout has reduced the economic benefits by over £1,013 million 
in comparison to the expectations made in 2014 
Lack of interoperability of first generation SMETS1 meters – causing a risk of stranded assets and 
negative impact on customer engagement 
Cost of installation – between 10-15% of properties may require more than one visit, potentially 
pushing up the cost by £1 billion 
Communications issues – with SMETS2 meters, prepay meters and meters in multiple occupancy 
dwellings is having a knock-on effect with their deployment 
Cost burden to suppliers of the roll-out programme – is potentially squeezing resources for 
innovation products such as ToU tariffs and integrated home services 
Source:(Shakoor et al., 2017) 
 
Other benefits of smart meters include the utilisation of ‘smart’ automated appliances, many new 
tariffs, including Time of Use Tariffs and Real Time Pricing, and half hourly settlement. Since April 2017, 
all medium and large businesses must be settled on their half-hourly electricity use under code 
modification P272; and from July 2017, suppliers who want to, are able to settle their small business 
and domestic consumers using half-hourly data. However, in July 2017 Ofgem published their launch 
statement on the Electricity Settlement Reform Significant Code Review which seeks to introduce 
mandatory half-hourly settlement (HHS) for domestic and smaller non-domestic customers (Ofgem, 
2017j). HHS will be a key enabler for these customers to engage in flexibility markets such as the LEM. 
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6.2 THE ROLE OF DEMAND SIDE RESPONSE 
OVERVIEW 
Demand side response (DSR) could involve LEM customers (commercial and domestic) increasing, 
decreasing, or shifting the time of their electricity usage in response to a signal. This could be to aid 
balancing of the local network, or to overcome a particular network constraint or to provide ancillary 
services to the System Operator or the DNO. In return for their flexibility, customers could receive 
financial incentives such as cheaper half-hourly tariffs or they could be paid directly for their actions (i.e. 
when participating in ancillary service markets). The large increase in flexibility requirements will result 
in significant growth of the overall value of such services in the future GB system (Shakoor et al., 2017). 
 
BENEFITS OF DSR 
DSR can deliver value to the electricity system in a range of ways including: - 
• Operational network balancing – DSR can allow demand to be turned up or turned down to help 
balance networks; helping avoid outages at times of system stress. Currently this occurs only on 
higher voltage networks but there is great potential for use at domestic level networks also. 
• Provision of capacity – lowering demand can free up capacity for other areas of the network. 
• Benefits to networks – can avoid the need for reinforcement of the network; support cheaper and 
quicker connections; contribute to avoided investment. 
• Supplier / consumer usage reduction at times of high prices – enables consumers to receive lower 
bills 
• Maximise the use of DERs - reducing the need for new peaking plant capacity and investment  
(PA Consulting Group, 2016). 
 
There has been renewed interest in DSR globally as a result of climate change and energy security 
issues coming to the forefront of the political agenda (Warren, 2014). Many utilities in the US are 
obliged by regulatory or legislative requirements to consider DSR in their resource planning, while the 
Energy Efficiency Directive of the EU states that the planning process should consider the peak shaving 
effects of DSR (Paterakis, Erdinç and Catalão, 2017). 
Making demand response happen is also an essential part of the European Union policy strategy 
reflected in The Third Energy Package (Vallés et al., 2016). GB is moving ahead with integrating DSR 
into its ancillary services (see Section 3.2), but there are still questions to be addressed to facilitate 
wider participation in the electricity sector, which the EU ‘Winter Energy Package’ (European 
Commission, 2016b) is currently attempting to deal with. Questions include efficiency and competition 
to achieve the wider system benefits of DSR and industry requirements to remain compliant with the 
EU internal energy market (Edwards, 2017). 
A study by the Smart Energy Demand Coalition mapped the ability of DSR to access markets across the 
European member states in 2014 and then updated this again in 2017 (as shown in Figure 6). They 
found that improvements had been made in almost all European countries, but that this had been 
gradual. They assessed that the launch of the Winter Package marked the start of the large-scale 
unlocking of DSR potential in Europe, with current DSR activity standing at around 20GW out of a 
potential value of 100GW, rising to 160GW in 2030 (SEDC, 2017). 
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Figure 6 Explicit DSR in Europe (2017) 
 
Source: (SEDC, 2017) 
 
REGULATORY AND MARKET BARRIERS 
DSR in GB has to date been mainly provided by large scale industrial and commercial (I&C) companies 
only (CGI, 2017) due to these customers having access to metering requirements, HHS and smart tariffs 
which have enabled this. However a survey by Ofgem in 2016 (Ofgem, 2016) found that 71% of 
companies in the industrial, commercial and public sectors do not participate in DSR due to a number 
of barriers, including concern over business performance and a difficulty in understanding the products 
and channels available. 
As shown in Table 1 GB Markets & Technologies in Section 3.1, DSR has been able to access the 
Capacity Market (CM) and several ancillary service markets to date, albeit the percentage share in these 
markets has been low. However given the expected changes to the ancillary services market (Section 
3.2), the announcement that stacking will be allowed across these markets (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a) 
and recognition of the role of independent aggregators (Section 6.3) this percentage share could rise in 
future. 
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Domestic and smaller non-domestic customers have to date had limited participation with DSR (due to 
the above metering arrangements not being in place to allow for their participation). However, with 
these improvements, DSR could become a future market for those customers as well. 
Most of the discussion of DSR potential concentrates on ‘active’ demand-side participation but 
acknowledgment should also be made that not all domestic and small commercial consumers may 
want to actively participate, due to the potential time and commitment involved, and therefore may 
prefer to act ‘passively’ (Warren, 2014) and (Balta-ozkan et al., 2014). Local energy markets should 
therefore ensure that involvement can be automated and as hassle-free as possible for these 
customers. Automated operation may prove more popular than approaches that require consumer 
involvement, even where the latter offers greater systemic benefits or is more economically efficient. 
BEIS and Ofgem identified multiple barriers for customers in participating in DSR markets in the ‘Smart 
Systems and Flexibility Plan’ (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a) as shown in Table 8. In addition, National Grid 
are facilitating Power Responsive to stimulate increased participation in DSR by 2020, which from 2018 
onwards will include domestic and small non-domestic customers as well as I&C customers, which it has 
concentrated on to date. The TSO has an ambition to procure 30-50% of its balancing services by 2020 
through demand side measures (BEIS and Ofgem, 2016), which to-date stands at just 6% (PA 
Consulting Group, 2016). 
Table 8 Barriers to DSR  
Barrier Possible Solution 
Access to ancillary services Rationalisation of services to simplify process and align 
timescales for tendering. National Grid will also trial auctions 
from late 2018. 
Restrictions on the ability to stack revenues from 
ancillary services alongside Capacity Market (CM) 
Allow stacking of revenues between the CM and ancillary 
services. Review exclusivity clauses. 
Access to Balancing Market   Provide for participation from independent aggregators. 
Baselining & settlement Clarify the role of aggregators in regard to relationship with 
suppliers / set a code of conduct. 
Should aggregators be balancing responsible parties i.e. 
exposed to imbalance pricing? 
Aggregators can’t change the portfolio of DSR 
participants which make up a CM unit. Therefore, 
if one participant withdraws the whole contract is 
nullified. 
Enable asset reallocation by DSR providers. 
 
Technical issues Simplify metering requirements. 
Improve forward-looking signals for network usage to 
encourage price flexibility related DSR.  
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Structure of network charges  Being reviewed through the Embedded Benefits Review / TCR 
/ forward looking charges review.  
Limited awareness of DSR & financial benefits of 
DSR 
Power Responsive project launched by National Grid to raise 
awareness and engage with businesses. 
Limited access to DSR market for domestic and 
smaller non-domestic customers due mainly to 
smart meter rollout not being complete 
Smart meter rollout should be complete by 2020. 
Limited availability of smart tariffs, smart 
appliances 
Half hourly settlement – introduce mandatory HHS for 
domestic and smaller non-domestic customers. 
Encourage smart tariffs. 
Set standards for smart appliances. 
Domestic energy storage. 
EV charge points & Vehicle to Grid technologies. 
Cyber security Study commissioned to assess magnitude of cyber security 
risk up to 2030. 
Sources: (BEIS and Ofgem, 2016) and (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a) 
 
DER PLANNING 
An essential step in transforming to a flexible local energy market and realising the potential of DSR is 
to encourage the building of distributed energy resources (DER) for both supply and demand (Mitchell, 
2017).  
The UK Government commissioned an international study in 2016 (Future Power System Architecture) 
which compared the GB energy system with a number of other countries facing similar system 
challenges (California, New York, Texas, Germany and Ireland). International experts consulted in the 
study expressed the need for greater system wide planning and found that the value that DERs can 
bring is being accepted internationally. Indeed, policies in all of the countries reviewed are aimed at 
promoting and encouraging the adoption of DERs (IET, 2016). 
Through the Renewable Energy Planning Database BEIS track all renewable energy planning 
applications submitted (over 1MW) on a monthly basis to forecast trends in RES generation as part of 
monitoring progress against the UKs renewable energy targets (BEIS, 2018). Although this gives a 
national overview of installations to monitor uptake, it is limited by size and does not assign any value 
to how these installations can assist in network planning and operations.  
IGov12 have argued for some time that Ofgem should require DNOs to formulate DER Plans for each 
DNO area to enable all stakeholders to know what DER are available within the network (Mitchell, 
                                                                    
12 Innovation and Governance for a Sustainable Economy 2012-2016 and Innovation and Governance for Future Energy 
Systems 2012-2019, part of the Energy Policy Group at the University of Exeter 
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2017) and to consider these when network planning. This is already happening in New York and 
California as shown below. The value of a DER Plan is to: - 
• Begin the process of moving towards a fuller integration of DER into DNOs network planning, 
operations and investment 
• Determine optimal locations for the deployment of DER 
• Support efficient DER deployment through market arrangements 
• Remove barriers to DER deployment 
 (adapted from CPUC, 2014) 
 
The extent to which DER have been assessed and valued; the extent to which those DER values can be 
captured within markets and from system operation payments; and the degree to which non-wire 
alternatives (NWA) can be incorporated into system operation have major implications on how 
networks could be charged; how they could be regulated and the type of tariffs which would 
complement a DER system (Poulter, Mitchell and Hoggett, 2017) and (Mitchell, 2017).  
Additionally, data, communications networks and information flows are increasingly being viewed as 
part of the energy system. As the energy market transition unfolds these are likely to become critical 
components of distribution system planning and facilitating integration of distributed energy 
resources. The task of converting data to information has been highlighted as a new capability required 
within the sector, and this is only likely to become more complex as more devices connect to and 
become part of the energy systems (IET, 2016).  
 
DSR LESSONS FROM NEW YORK AND CALIFORNIA 
Both New York State and California have instituted a regulated process to reveal their DER resource 
and value. In both cases, they have required distribution utilities to undertake distribution resource 
plans, and have given them a couple of years to complete them. In New York this is called a distribution 
system implementation plan (DSIP) and in California it is called a distribution resource plan (DRP). The 
process of developing them opens up access to data and involves all interested stakeholders (Mitchell, 
2017). 
However, even with policy support there are still perceived barriers to the implementation of DSR in 
these States which can provide insight to the emerging GB market (see Table 9). This table has been 
created by taking the issues identified in New York and California and then applying them to the GB 
market. Not all of the issues directly translate to the GB situation due to different market arrangements 
between the US and GB, but each issue can provide insight to the barriers which have been uncovered 
throughout this report; particularly regarding conflicts and co-ordination between the TSO and the 
DNOs, and the stacking of contracts between different market services. 
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Table 9 DSR Lessons from New York and California 
Issue Why is this an issue? GB Lesson Where 
Discussed 
in Report 
Forecasting – 
Improving 
Forecasting 
Methodologies to 
Predict System 
Needs 
Utilities13 need to adequately 
forecast DER impacts as the 
prevalence of DER increase. 
Inclusion of energy efficiency 
and solar PV in load forecasts 
reveals that consumption is 
declining or growing more 
slowly than previously 
forecast. Stakeholders need 
to understand how 
investments in energy 
efficiency and local energy 
resources contribute to a 
more cost-effective grid over 
time. 
DNOs need a methodology for 
anticipating the effect of intermittent 
generation on the networks (i.e. DER 
Plans). This will help inform decisions on 
future investments. 
Energy efficiency and impacts of DERs 
should also be taken into account when 
forecasting requirements for balancing, 
ancillary services and the Capacity 
Market. 
However, whilst energy efficiency and 
onsite generation will reduce overall 
load, this needs to be balanced against 
the anticipated rise in electricity needed 
for the electrification of heat and EVs. 
 
 
4.2 
 
 
 
3.2, 3.4 & 
3.5 
Local dispatchability Conflicts between wholesale 
balancing, area and sub-area 
balancing. 
Applicable to ENA Open Networks 
project on models for DER. Conflicts can 
arise when procuring / dispatching DSR 
at both SO and DNO level. 
 
4.2 
Lack of a coherent 
vision for DSR 
services 
There are different and 
competing visions of DSR due 
to historical DSR being 
mainly utilised for peak 
shaving and emergency 
response only and anticipated 
future services around 
frequent availability and 
frequent dispatch. There is 
also no discussion around 
providing incentives and 
value to customers in 
participating in DSR. 
Overarching DSR strategy / direction 
needed from BEIS / Ofgem. 
Link to SO work with Power Responsive. 
 
3.2 & 6.2 
Short advance 
notification 
More value to DER if capable 
of dispatch within 30 mins, 
instead of day-ahead, but 
short notification for DER 
Coordination needed between SO and 
DNO. Which market will be most 
lucrative to DER? 
4.2 
                                                                    
13 Utility companies in NY currently include the distribution and supply arm of the electricity system 
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requires more coordination 
with customers and shorter 
windows reduces the pool of 
eligible customers. 
 
Some products / customers may be 
more suited to long-term markets (day / 
weeks in advance) rather than short-
term markets (minutes in advance). 
Outages If DSR providers have other 
commitments they are 
usually unable to help in 
times of outages. Yet, the 
inability to utilise a significant 
number of DER during an 
outage is identified as a 
failure of the resource. 
Potential conflicts between ancillary 
services (such as frequency response) 
and other contracted commitments. 
3.2 & 4.2 
Lack of procurement 
target 
Unlike storage which has a 
specific target to be met by a 
specific timescale, DSR has a 
‘soft’ target going back to 
2003 which has already been 
met. This has resulted in 
capacity remaining flat or 
declining in terms of growth 
as there is little 
encouragement to procure 
over other resources. 
 
National Grid has a target to achieve 30-
50% DSR in ancillary services by 2020 
through the Power Responsive 
campaign. DNOs could also incorporate 
a target within their DSO strategies. 
3.2 
DSR is required to be 
cost effective 
relative to other 
resources 
The things that are stated as 
future values for DSR: 
increased availability, 
frequent dispatch and short 
notification times, are not 
reflected as significant values 
in the cost effectiveness 
methodology. 
DSR currently only offered 1-year 
contracts in the Capacity Market - 
would longer contracts ensure more 
market confidence? Stacking between 
the CM, ancillary services and DNO 
services should enable access to more 
revenues. 
 
3.2, 3.5 & 
4.2 
DER Plans & 
Mapping 
Greater emphasis on 
providing up-to-date 
information is needed 
considering the importance 
of this data for DG developers 
and other third-party DER 
providers. 
DNOs should develop regular DER Plans 
with up-to-date information and use 
this information to inform their 
operational and investment decisions. 
DER Plans should then be made publicly 
available to inform DER providers of 
optimal locations and market 
arrangements for the deployment of 
DER. 
4.2 & 6.2 
Planning for Non-
Wires Alternatives 
(NWAs) 
 
As the energy grid becomes 
more dynamic and DER levels 
increase, some traditional 
projects may be deferred or 
cancelled by NWAs that may 
More acknowledgement needed of the 
value of network savings that could be 
achieved through deferment of network 
4.2 
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 be more cost-effective than 
utility solutions. 
Future DSIPs should provide 
updated assessments of the 
types of projects suitable for 
NWAs. They should also 
describe how utilities are 
making efforts to reduce the 
lead-time required for NWA 
implementation. The long 
lead-time should decrease as 
the process becomes more 
standardized and utilities are 
more familiar with 
implementing NWA projects. 
upgrades and potential recompense to 
those providing these NWA solutions. 
At present, one solution used by DNOs 
is active network management (ANM) in 
Constraint Managed Zones (CMZ) which 
allows a new generator to connect 
within the zone for a quicker connection 
with a lower connection fee, in 
exchange for the DNO being able to 
curtail generation at times of system 
stress. This is a very competitive 
solution for the DNO as they still receive 
a connection fee AND they can avoid 
network reinforcement costs by 
curtailing generation instead of 
upgrading the network. This is 
financially beneficial to the DNO, but, it 
incurs financial risk and uncertainty to 
the generator as the DNOs are able to 
curtail generation instead of procuring 
market solutions for flexibility, thus 
undermining the value in market-based 
flexibility services.  
DNOs should include in their Business 
Plans (or future DER Plans) how they 
will include NWAs and the types of 
suitable projects which will be 
considered along with timescales for 
implementation. 
 
Data A large obstacle to achieving 
a resilient, DER-integrated 
energy grid is how little data 
utilities can gather and share 
regarding the operation of 
the grid. 
BEIS & Ofgem should provide 
regulatory clarity over data – in 
particular encourage data sharing 
between the SO, DNOs, suppliers and 
platforms such as the LEM at the 
greatest possible granularity. This can 
include data regarding network 
constraints and the availability of DER 
on the network. Also, decisions needed 
on availability of meter data. Data 
protection regulations, including 
European General Data Protection 
Regulation potentially make it difficult 
to access suitably granular meter data. 
ELEXON are working with Ofgem on 
potential approaches to meet the GDPR 
requirements as part of the Half Hourly 
Settlement design work  (Elexon, 
2017a). 
 
4.1 & 4.2 
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EV Infrastructure More detailed plans needed 
on how to engage in the 
development of the EV 
market, enable EV 
infrastructure deployment, 
and engage with customers. 
Need to understand impacts on the 
network, demand and variation by 
locality. 
EV infrastructure has huge potential for 
delivering flexibility services in the 
future with V2G technologies. 
 
4.2 
Distributed System 
Platform Investment 
The utilities need to invest in 
systems and technologies 
that provide information that 
enables new entrants to 
participate in a networked 
and responsive grid. 
 
Integrated system platforms will be key 
to providing a local energy market / P2P 
trading / local balancing. 
Consider models put forward by the 
ENA Open Networks project. 
 
 
 
4.2 
Sources: (Greentech Leadership Group, 2014)  (California Energy Commission, 2017) and (Acadia Center, 2017) 
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6.3 THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT AGGREGATORS 
OVERVIEW 
Aggregators provide an important route to market for DSR providers. Aggregation can be defined as 
the act of grouping different customers within the power system (i.e. consumers, producers, 
prosumers) to act as a single entity when engaging in electricity markets or selling services to the TSO 
or DNO (Burger et al., 2017).  Through aggregation the value of DSR can be enhanced by bringing 
together providers who would be too small to participate in the markets individually. In addition 
aggregators have detailed knowledge of these markets which many small DSR providers might lack. 
Aggregation can also increase the reliability of DSR by bringing together resources from across 
different industries and geographies (CRA, 2017a).  
 
REGULATORY AND MARKET BARRIERS TO INDEPENDENT AGGREGATORS 
As independent aggregation is a relatively new concept in GB there is as yet no legally defined role for 
these actors. Article 17.3 of the EU ‘Winter Package’ (European Commission, 2016a) requires member 
states to define frameworks for independent aggregators along principles that enable full participation 
in the market. However, currently in GB, aggregators can only access some markets directly, whilst 
other markets can only be accessed through the supplier (i.e. the Wholesale Market and the Balancing 
Market).  
The ability of aggregators to access markets varies across Europe. For example, in Germany, 
aggregators require agreement with the supplier before they can access the flexibility of the consumer, 
though this may be changing. In France, on the other hand, pre-determined arrangements allow 
aggregators to access all markets without negotiating first with a supplier (PA Consulting Group, 2016). 
One of the key debates about the development of an aggregation component in the electricity market 
is the impact that aggregators might have on suppliers, particularly in relation to a supplier’s demand 
position in the market  (De Heer, 2015). Independent aggregators are currently independent of the 
supplier of the customer providing the DSR and as such are not responsible for the customer’s metered 
supply. This means that independent aggregators are not currently able to register Balancing 
Mechanism Units (BMUs) and thereby participate in the Balancing Market (BM) (CRA, 2017a). 
The ‘Winter Package’ states that aggregators should have the right to enter the market without 
consent from other market participants, and should not be required to pay compensation to suppliers 
or generators (European Commission, 2016a). This effectively means aggregators are not “Balancing 
Responsible Parties”14 (BRPs) and can control their customer load without being exposed to imbalance 
pricing. It also means suppliers may not be able to fully invoice the difference between the consumers 
metered volumes and their full electricity procurement cost (Edwards, 2017). 
                                                                    
14
 A balancing responsible party is a market role in power systems that is specifically defined to settle differences between the 
scheduled and actual values of consumption, generation and trade 
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Eurelectric argues that aggregators should be made BRPs and be financially responsible for keeping 
their positions balanced as this is consistent with electricity market principles. They can do this either 
through mandating aggregators’ trade energy with suppliers or through ex-post correction of 
imbalance volumes (Eurelectric, 2017). Article 17.4 of the Winter Package goes on to state that 
aggregators should pay compensation under ‘specific circumstances’, but Eurelectric argue this does 
not clarify the situation (Edwards, 2017).  
Whilst aggregation might be a relatively new option in the EU, in the US independent aggregators are 
highly active and market rules in New York (NYPDS, 2014) and California (California ISO, 2015) are 
designed to ensure that they flourish; whereas in Europe it can be argued that debate to date has been 
focussed around the value or disvalue of superimposing third party aggregators over retailers (Burger et 
al., 2017). 
BEIS & Ofgem have already identified some of the issues facing aggregators in the ‘Smart Systems and 
Flexibility Plan’ (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a). Additionally, Ofgem adds further detail and affirms that 
balancing responsibility should rest with the party which created them, and that the bulk energy issue is 
most efficiently dealt with in the contractual arrangements between the supplier and consumer 
(Ofgem, 2017g). 
Alongside its view Ofgem published a report by CRA on the economic value of DSR participation in the 
BM, estimating benefits in the range of £110mn to £400mn by 2020 (CRA, 2017a). The introduction of 
Modifications P344 and P355 intended to implement changes to the BM, (as discussed in Section 3.4) 
would enable smaller generators to access the BM through aggregating themselves into a larger BMU; 
which could be through the use of an independent aggregator if aggregators are considered alongside 
P355.  
These issues and BEIS/Ofgem’s proposed actions are summarised in Table 10. 
Table 10 Barriers for Aggregators 
Barrier Possible Solution 
 
No legally defined role for independent 
aggregators 
To enable independent aggregators to enter the market at scale, 
it is critical that their role and responsibilities are clarified. In 
particular, it is important that the relationships between suppliers, 
balancing responsible parties (BRPs), and independent 
aggregators are clear, fair, and allow for fair competition (SEDC, 
2017) 
 
Balancing Mechanism – no current route to access 
BM 
 
Create a new route for independent aggregators to access the 
BM. Will need code modifications. 
 
Capacity Market  
 
 
Simplify metering requirements. 
Stack revenue streams across markets. 
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Sources: (BEIS and Ofgem, 2016) (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a) (Ofgem, 2017g) 
 
6.4 THE ROLE OF STORAGE 
OVERVIEW 
Storage will be a key component of the LEM due to its flexibility and diversity of uses. It can be 
deployed at distribution, commercial and domestic level providing a wide range of revenue streams for 
LEM participants.  
The utilisation of storage in constrained areas of the network can provide cheaper NWA solutions to 
DNOs through the optimising of supply and demand and can help generators overcome issues with 
curtailment at times of network stress. 
BEIS and Ofgem are supportive of enabling the storage market to develop in GB and have identified a 
number of regulatory changes which could encourage more storage in the ‘Smart Systems and 
Flexibility Plan’ (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a). 
 
Aggregators can’t change the portfolio of DSR 
participants which make up a CM unit. Therefore, 
if one participant withdraws the whole contract is 
nullified. 
 
Enable asset reallocation. 
 
Other markets 
 
Ensure a level playing field for access to additional energy markets 
where aggregators can be accommodated efficiently. 
Improve signals for network usage. 
 
 
Measurement - 
Potential for gaming 
 
Measure DSR volumes and ensure that baseline gaming 
opportunities are mitigated. 
 
Cost reflective pricing 
 
Allow for payments to cover the cost of energy sold on by the 
aggregator, which was initially sourced by the supplier to help 
ensure a more cost-reflective supply curve at a system level and a 
level playing field between different technologies. 
 
Balancing responsibility and delivery risk 
 
Both balancing costs and delivery risks should be borne by the 
parties that created them. 
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BENEFITS OF STORAGE 
Storage technologies can contribute to electricity system operation, and can in particular alleviate 
some of the issues associated with variable renewable generation and may enhance the economics of 
household generation.  Its potential benefits include: 
• Provision of ancillary services to the System Operator and DNOs 
• Supplying electricity during outages, enhancing system stability and resilience 
• Storing power produced by renewable sources when output is high, and exporting the power when 
generation is low (or prices are high) 
• Storing power during times of network stress or to overcome a network constraint 
• Reducing peak loads 
 
Depending on siting, storage can reduce losses on transmission or distribution lines, as well as reducing 
the need for network upgrades or reinforcement by optimising supply and demand at specific locations.  
The Electricity Storage Network consider that in the long-term, storage could be one of the most 
important tools to reducing the overall system operating cost by optimising generation, transmission, 
generation and supply (Electricity Storage Network, 2014) 
 
Figure 7 Benefits of energy storage 
 
Source: (Electricity Storage Network, 2014)  
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There are many different types of storage which fall under six main categories: 
1. Solid State Batteries - a range of electrochemical storage solutions, including advanced chemistry 
batteries and capacitors 
2. Flow Batteries - batteries where the energy is stored directly in the electrolyte solution 
3. Flywheels - mechanical devices that harness rotational energy to deliver instantaneous electricity 
4. Compressed Air Energy Storage - utilising compressed air to create a potent energy reserve 
5. Thermal - capturing heat and cold to create energy on demand 
6. Pumped Hydro-Power - creating large-scale reservoirs of energy with water 
(Source: Energy Storage Association website) 
 
Storage can be extremely flexible in terms of scale – large installations can be connected to 
transmission networks, while smaller scale storage can be deployed at distribution, commercial and 
even household level.  This flexibility, however, contributes to the difficulties of drawing up policies and 
regulations designed to encourage the greater use of storage technology, as a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach will not reflect the diversity of services that the technology can offer at different scales.   
Storage can either be installed in-front of or behind-the-meter. Most storage at the moment is utility 
scale ‘in-front of the meter’ storage (85% of all storage in the USA in 2016) (Maloney, 2017) with 
pumped hydro storage representing around 95% of total global storage capacity. In the UK in 2016 
there were 39 installed stand-alone energy storage projects (REA and Energy Storage UK, 2016).  
However the behind-the-meter storage market is due to grow considerably in GB over the next few 
years due in part to the benefits that can be gained with combining battery storage with solar PV and 
also with the introduction of half hourly domestic settlement (REA and Energy Storage UK, 2016). 
Behind-the-meter means that the storage is installed on a customer’s property and on the customer’s 
side of the electricity meter. Being able to store excess generation behind-the-meter will enable 
customers to utilise more of their own generation, thus reducing the need to purchase additional 
electricity from a supplier. Currently this would also mean avoiding network charge costs as electricity 
generated and consumed on site behind-the-meter is exempt from these costs. However, this position 
could change through the current Targeted Charging Review taking place (see Section 5) which seeks 
to re-evaluate who should pay for what in network charging.  
Battery storage had agreements awarded for the first time in the 2016 T-4 Capacity Market auction 
(see Section 3.5) and has been performing in various ancillary services. National Grid introduced the 
Enhanced Frequency Response (EFR) service in 2016 aimed predominantly at battery storage assets 
providing frequency response in one second or less. The tender to secure 200MW of capacity attracted 
interest from over 70 projects with a cumulative capacity in excess of 1.3GW, highlighting the interest 
from storage developers. This was the first signal in GB of a specific revenue stream for battery storage 
that has triggered such interest (Papadopoulos et al., 2016). However, in the ‘Product Roadmap’ 
published by National Grid in December 2017 this service has now been removed in line with the 
rationalisation of products (see Section 3.2). This isn’t necessarily a problem for storage however, as the 
new products have already seen significant interest from storage providers (Pratt, 2017) and they 
should be easier to access for the reasons set out in Section 3.2. Indeed National Grid expects electricity 
storage capacity to grow rapidly over the next few years, nearing 6 GW by 2020 (CRA, 2017b). 
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Battery storage currently has access to several revenue streams as identified in Figure 8 and discussed 
previously in Section 3. The ability to stack revenues across these different streams will be important 
for the financial viability of storage providers. 
Figure 8 Current Battery Revenue Streams 
 
Source: (CRA, 2017b) 
* System services are referred to as ‘ancillary’ services throughout this document 
 
REGULATORY AND MARKET BARRIERS 
BEIS and Ofgem are supportive of enabling the storage market to develop in GB as can be shown by 
their ‘Call for Evidence’ (BEIS and Ofgem, 2016) and the ‘Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan’ (BEIS and 
Ofgem, 2017a). In those documents, they identified a number of areas where policy or regulation could 
contribute to encouraging more storage, and proposed a number of solutions to enhance the 
environment for more storage (see Table 11).  They have also followed up on these solutions by issuing 
consultation documents later in 2017 on ‘Clarifying the regulatory framework for electricity storage: 
licensing’ (Ofgem, 2017a) and ‘Draft Guidance for Generators’ (Ofgem, 2017b). 
Table 11 Barriers to Storage 
Theme Barrier Possible Solution 
Network connections Limited understanding of the 
complexity surrounding the need 
for both import and export 
capacity, and the differing uses, 
sizes and locations of connections 
can result in lengthy and expensive 
connections. 
Ofgem will work with industry and DNOs 
to improve the connection process, for 
example by introducing flexible 
connections which will be cheaper and 
quicker. 
However, flexible connections (i.e. ANM) 
can have a detrimental financial impact on 
distribution connected storage in that 
batteries could be prevented from 
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discharging at optimal times due to DNO 
contractual limitations.  
Cross reference with Section 4.2. 
 
Network charging Distribution connected storage 
currently pays both import and 
export network charges as it ‘uses 
the network for both’. 
The Targeted Charging Review (Ofgem, 
2017o) considers the current system of 
network residual charges to ensure storage 
doesn’t pay the ‘demand residual’ element 
of network charges at T & D level.  
However, see Section 5 as the TCR has 
wider implications. 
 
Regulatory clarity Different definitions of storage are 
used for different regulatory 
purposes, including licensing and 
the capacity market. Need to 
develop a common definition for 
use across different policy areas. 
Ofgem consulted on the regulatory 
framework for electricity storage in Sept 17 
(Ofgem, 2017a) and affirmed that the 
Electricity Act 1989 will be amended to 
include a definition of storage as a distinct 
subset of the generation asset class. 
Storage is also being defined in the Grid 
Code (GC096). 
 
Final consumption 
levies 
Several levy costs are applied twice 
to storage (once on charging and 
once on supply), including the 
costs of the Renewables 
Obligation, Feed-in Tariff, Capacity 
Market and the Climate Change 
Levy. 
This results in double counting of 
supply to the consumer on the 
same electricity. 
 
Storage should be exempted from final 
consumption levies. Ofgem are therefore 
proposing a new licence condition 
‘Condition E1’ to provide clarity that ‘The 
licensee shall not have self-consumption as 
the primary function when operating its 
storage facility’ (Ofgem, 2017a) to 
overcome the double counting issue. 
Planning As storage is yet to be classified or 
defined, it is unclear how storage 
fits within the planning 
framework. Storage is currently 
defined in planning as an 
‘electricity generating station’ 
causing uncertainties over whether 
it should be in national guidance or 
dealt with at the local planning 
level. 
 
A review of planning legislation will assess 
whether guidance can be simplified i.e. by 
including a national planning threshold for 
storage and associated planning guidance. 
However, there is no timescale set for 
amending this. 
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Co-location Lack of clarity how storage might 
interact with renewable 
installations receiving support 
under the RO, CFD or FIT regimes 
Ofgem produced Draft Guidance Dec 17  
(Ofgem, 2017b) to provide clarity on when 
storage can co-locate alongside renewable 
generation without risking agreements. 
Ofgem consider that where the scheme 
requirements are being met, storage can 
be deployed without risk to accreditation, 
although decisions would be made on a 
case-by-case basis.  
 
Ownership The EU ‘Winter Package’ states 
that DSOs should not be allowed 
to own, develop, manage or 
operate storage in order to 
promote market competition. 
BEIS & Ofgem announced that DNOs 
should not own or operate storage to allow 
market competition. This should be 
beneficial to the LEM but some DNO’s 
have argued against this,15 although WPD 
have signaled that their position is that 
DNO owned / operated storage should 
only be used as a ‘last resort’ if the market 
fails to deliver. 
 
Sources: (BEIS and Ofgem, 2016) (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017a) (Ofgem, 2017a) 
 
While these measures will go some way to addressing the current regulatory ambiguity surrounding 
storage in GB, other issues have also been identified by GB stakeholders, including: 
• Domestic HHS to encourage domestic take-up of storage combined with PV 
• Storage to be acknowledged by BEIS as an essential part of the energy mix, with targets for adoption set 
out in a Storage Strategy (either as a % target or a MW target) 
• Renewable subsidies should be provided for storage to incentivise take-up 
• Financial support needs to be given for R&D projects 
• An analysis of the network savings that could be achieved through deferment of network upgrades should 
be undertaken (with financial remuneration available to storage providers for providing these savings) 
• Flexible connections controlled by the DNOs can limit output periods 
• An agreed definition for electricity storage that allows for incremental revisions as technologies mature 
• Education and dissemination of lessons learnt to industry and to policy makers 
• Development of local energy markets utilising storage as part of local supply. 
 
Sources: (Electricity Storage Network, 2017) (REA and Energy Storage UK, 2016) 
 
As with any new technology, adopting a strategy for technology development and deployment can 
contribute to the rate and scale of dissemination, in part because such an approach can contribute to 
                                                                    
15 https://www.cleanenergynews.co.uk/news/storage/dnos-should-own-and-operate-battery-storage-funded-by-grid-
services-norther  
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investor confidence.  A strategy for storage would not be straightforward, given that it is so flexible in 
terms of scale.  Its potential to interact with other sectors also needs to be taken into account, 
especially given the interaction between storage (battery) technologies and the anticipated increase in 
uptake of Electric Vehicles (EVs).  The strategy would therefore have to be multi-scale and multi-sector, 
with a long term vision of the development of electricity networks (IRENA, 2015). 
This is a considerable task.  As an interim measure, the REA suggests a short term ‘quick fix’ (REA, 2017) 
announcement from BEIS to give the market confidence that progress will be made, and to unlock 
some deployment, before the longer-term solution to amending primary legislation is made. It is worth 
pointing out that such a quick fix approach might be desirable in the short term, but measures put in 
place should not result in conflicts with any longer term strategic approach.  
In time, cost reductions associated with battery storage should drive down the costs of EVs and make 
storage increasingly attractive for a range of customers. New storage markets could also emerge, such 
as the car industry selling older batteries from EVs into the domestic and I&C markets, making it a more 
affordable option for customers to adopt.  
 
LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA 
Californian market rules did not until recently support the ability of energy storage resources to stack 
more than one service. The California Public Utilities Commission recognised this as a market failing 
which reduced the economic value of storage to the electricity system. The Commission therefore 
approved eleven new market rules in January 2018 (CPUC, 2018) aimed at enabling resources to stack 
value and revenue streams through the delivery of multiple services to the wholesale market, 
distribution grid, transmission system and other venues.  
The Commission identified five ‘service domains’ for provision of services (customer, distribution, 
transmission, wholesale market and resource adequacy) with a pyramid hierarchy of operability i.e. the 
customer domain can trade in all markets; the distribution domain can trade in all markets except the 
customer market and the transmission domain can trade in all markets except the distribution and 
customer market. The objective being to enable storage systems to stack value by being able to deliver 
multiple services to multiple markets. 
These services were then divided into ‘reliability services’ and ‘non-reliability services’, with the former 
always having priority in dispatch.  
The Commission clarified that these rules are interim and may change in time due to lessons learnt 
through their implementation: 
“we are cognizant that these rules will need to evolve over time as market prices, penalties, and 
services continue to evolve, and that allowing some flexibility for storage resources to provide 
multiple reliability services in the near term may provide important learning opportunities to inform 
future policymaking (CPUC, 2018).” 
The Commission’s commitment to act swiftly to remove the economic barriers to storage and then 
keep a watching brief as the policies unfold should be applauded. This decision is reminiscent of the 
REA’s call for BEIS to issue a quick fix to ensure market confidence, but with the caveat that any 
measures adopted should not conflict with longer term strategic goals. This approach also fits with the 
‘plan, monitor and manage’ approach which is inherent in the UK planning system.  
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6.5  THE ROLE OF PEER-TO-PEER TRADING  
OVERVIEW 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading can be defined as local energy trading between participants, where 
the excess energy, or demand reduction, from many small-scale DERs is traded amongst local 
individuals and organisations. Essentially, allowing households to become small energy providers 
(adapted from Murkin et al., 2016) and (Long et al., 2017). 
P2P trading would appear to be one of the fundamental values of a LEM; offering the ability to trade 
electricity locally, within a defined area and between defined participants without the need for a third 
party licensed supplier (TPLS). However P2P trading in GB currently faces several regulatory and 
financial hurdles as will be discussed, the main one being that the model represents a fundamental shift 
from the supplier hub model. 
 
PICLO 
One of the closest examples of P2P that’s commercially operating in GB at present is the Piclo model 
developed by Open Utility and partnered with supplier Good Energy. However, Piclo is not as yet a true 
P2P trader, due to the need to partner with a TPLS. 
The Piclo model provides a platform to match renewable energy generators with local customers, 
based on current supply and demand from measured smart meter data. The platform gives customers 
the option to select where their energy comes from and from what source i.e. wind, hydro or solar. This 
can result in a better Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) deal for generators (Hall and Roelich, 2016). 
However, the model requires the software platform operator to partner with a TPLS, in this case Good 
Energy, for the billing and balancing functions (ibid) in compliance with current GB regulations which  
necessitate that at present all electricity trading must be via a licensed supplier (Ofgem, 2017e). 
Piclo provides visualisation of customers DUoS  charges (see Section 5) to incentivise consumers to 
shift and reduce their electricity usage during peak times (Open Utility, 2016). Based on a time-of-use 
calculation for half-hourly metered import customers, the charges are split into red, amber and green 
time periods as shown in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9 Piclo Visualisation 
 
Source: (Open Utility, 2016) 
 
Piclo is not however currently able to achieve reduced DUoS charges for consumers based on 
consumers purchasing locally generated electricity. Open Utility have held discussions with DNOs and 
Ofgem, arguing that if it can be demonstrated that only a few kilometres of the network are utilised 
between generator and customer, then there should be potential to reduce the system charge. Trial 
data from the Eden Project indicates that local generation matching could reduce their annual DUoS 
charge by up to 39% or £20,000 (Coyne, 2017). 
Piclo commenced trading in October 2015 but is currently limited to I&C customers only (due to the 
necessity of having half hourly settlement), although it is hoped to extend the model to a residential 
trial in Scotland as the next step. Piclo also recently won two international contracts partnering with 
supplier ERG in Italy (June 2017) and with Essent in the Netherlands (September 2017).  
The Piclo model is not currently bounded by geography, with generators and consumers in different 
network areas able to trade on the Piclo software exchange (Hall and Roelich, 2016). Therefore, this 
model does not as yet provide a solution to issues to do with local balancing, overcoming network 
constraints and curtailment and does not provide participants with financial rewards (in the form of 
lower network charges) for doing so. And although it allows renewable generators to match with 
demand customers it does not allow for Customer A to trade their excess on-site generation to 
Customer B. 
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REGULATORY AND MARKET BARRIERS 
A true P2P market would allow anyone to be able to sell their excess generation or demand reduction 
to whomever they choose within their locality, including from domestic customer to domestic 
customer. However, the current electricity trading regulations do not allow for this to happen due to 
several regulatory and market barriers as described below. 
One major regulatory barrier to be overcome is that currently all transactions must be made through a 
licensed supplier and customers can only have one licensed supplier (as with Piclo). It is therefore not a 
possibility for a domestic prosumer (say with solar PV) to sell any excess generation to anyone else – it 
currently either has to be stored on site, or sold to the grid via the supplier. On the reverse side, it is also 
not possible for a customer to buy electricity from anyone other than their sole contracted supplier. In a 
world where households can purchase many different products from many different companies, this 
‘supplier hub’ model is frustrating. 
Ofgem have recognised this as a barrier to establishing a local P2P market, which they include in their 
‘Future supply market arrangements – call for evidence’ launched in November 2017 (Ofgem, 2017e). 
The CfE seeks views on whether the current supplier hub arrangements are fit for purpose and where 
any future regulatory change should be focused and why. Although Ofgem are careful not to make any 
promise of regulatory change at this stage, they have stated that initial views on the way forward will 
be published in Spring 2018 (see Section 2.1). 
The next major regulatory barrier (interlinked with that above) is with billing and settlement. At 
present, all electricity that passes through a customer’s meter is purchased from a single licensed 
supplier who bills the customer based on total volume consumed. There is no mechanism to determine 
whether that electricity came from a different provider (such as in a P2P transaction) leading to the 
customer potentially paying twice on the P2P volume consumed. The amount paid to the licensed 
supplier would also include all relevant network charges and environmental policy surcharges.  
On the reverse side to this, whilst the supplier would on the one hand receive monies for electricity they 
hadn’t provided; they could also be charged imbalance fees if the volume of electricity consumed was 
larger than those contracted by the supplier via the market. 
There are also wider technological issues regarding metering. As stated above, Piclo is only available to 
I&C customers at present due to the need to have HHS. However even with the completion of the smart 
meter rollout and domestic HHS (see Section 6.1) there could still be problems regarding metering. For 
instance, if regulations are adapted to accommodate P2P transactions, and customers are able to buy 
from more than one supplier at a time, it is unknown how this will be managed by participants with the 
current metering infrastructure. Advice from one industry expert16 was that it is unknown whether the 
new SMETS2 meters would be able to handle more than one supplier per meter point. One solution 
might be via Blockchain technology (discussed later in this section) or via innovative software 
developed by a P2P marketplace, such as Piclo. However this still leaves issues relating to which 
supplier would hold the balance of power, which supplier would be responsible for balancing 
obligations, security obligations and environmental policy obligations such as FiT payments? 
                                                                    
16 Interview with industry expert 4 on 08/01/18 
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As shown above Piclo have not been able to achieve reduced network charges for participants. This 
aspect should be reviewed during the current Targeted Charging Review (Ofgem, 2017o) and the 
electricity network access project (Ofgem, 2017k) (see Section 5). Current thoughts at Ofgem though17 
are that charges should be fair for all users of the system; which in theory could lead to a charge per 
transaction in a P2P market to ensure that system costs are covered. 
Another issue to be explored regarding selling excess generation in a P2P transaction relates to Feed in 
Tariff (FiT) payments. At present accredited small-scale renewable technologies receive both 
generation and export FiT payments from participating licensed suppliers. Export payments are 
calculated as 50% of the electricity generated, and are currently valued at  5.03p per kWh (Ofgem, 
2018a). However, if exported generation was sold privately in a P2P transaction there would 
presumably need to be a mechanism which recognised that fact, relieving the supplier of the obligation 
to pay. Alternatively, the generating customer could opt out of all export payments to simplify the 
issue. Either way, the loss of the FiT export payment would reduce the profitability of any generation 
sold.       
Due to the above issues it is difficult to see how any monetary profit can be made by participants 
through P2P trading in the current regulatory environment. However, there are wider system and 
environmental benefits to be captured given the correct impetus. 
Local P2P trading could be beneficial to network management if all transactions occur within defined 
GSPs. This would reduce network constraints, if trading occurred below the constraint area or 
bottleneck. This in turn could reduce the likelihood of curtailment for existing renewable generators 
and allow for additional network connections to be made for currently stalled projects. 
Ofgem have recently received expressions of interest in P2P trading through their ‘Regulatory Sandbox’ 
trials (Ofgem, 2017h). The trials allow developers to test their products without meeting all of the usual 
regulatory requirements. P2P trials currently at the agreement stage through the Sandbox include: 
• A consortium led by EDF – trialling a P2P local energy trading platform enabled by Blockchain 
which allows residents in urban areas to source their energy from local renewables and trade that 
energy with their neighbours.  
• Empowered – trialling a local P2P energy trading scheme aimed at enabling consumers to trade 
electricity directly with each other to yield benefits for the local community and the wider 
electricity system. 
 
BLOCKCHAIN 
Blockchain could be an important enabler to unlocking the P2P market (hence its use within the EDF 
trial outlined above). Due to the ability for all parties within the blockchain to transact with each other, 
without the need for an external verifier, this could allow prosumers to sell to their neighbours without 
the verification of a TPLS (Hoggett, 2017) if regulatory barriers are removed.  
Blockchain is described by its developers as a distributed ledger that enables individuals to transact 
with each other without the need of a trusted third party, like a bank. The ledger has now evolved into a 
                                                                    
17 Interview with industry expert 4 on 08/01/18 
    EPG    70 
 
variety of models that can be applied to different business problems and dramatically improve the 
sharing of information (Hancock and Vaizey, 2016). These blocks are verified, and cannot be altered or 
removed without changing every transaction within them (Lempriere, 2017). The consensus is, that 
whilst the work behind blockchain was for financial transactions, blockchain has far wider potential, and 
is already being introduced into other sectors, including the energy sector (Hoggett, 2017).  
As well as providing confidence for potential P2P transactions, blockchain can give individuals more 
control over their personal data, which could become increasingly valuable and important in the 
distributed energy system. It does this by enabling people to own and maintain their data and make 
decisions on who can and can’t have access to it within the blockchain. Blockchain therefore can 
provide new ways for people to participate within markets (Hoggett, 2017).  
However there are issues around data privacy and consumer trust with blockchain which need to be 
clarified and in this respect Ofgem is already holding roundtable discussions with industry to try and 
identify potential pitfalls for implementing blockchain in the GB energy system (Ofgem, 2017l). Issues 
discussed so far include the trustworthiness of blockchain, participants’ dispute resolution and who 
should underwrite transactions. 
 
INTERNATIONAL P2P EXAMPLES 
P2P trading has been receiving much attention across the world with several innovators currently 
undertaking trials in different settings. 
The best-known example of P2P trading is the Brooklyn Microgrid in New York which was the first ever 
pilot micro-grid project developed using blockchain technology (Brooklyn Microgrid, 2017). The 
microgrid, known as the TransActive Grid, was created in 2016 by LO3 Energy in conjunction with 
Siemens. 
LO3 Energy uses Ethereum Blockchain software linked to PayPal to provide the means for members to 
settle transactions (Burger, 2016). LO3 Energy first started testing the concept in just one street but 
they are now expanding into the surrounding neighbourhood. Residents with solar PV can sell their 
excess energy to their neighbours, in P2P transactions (Lempriere, 2017). However, the system is not 
linked to settlement and is currently more expensive than buying electricity from the utility company.  
Similarly, Shanghai-based Energo Labs is using Qtum Blockchain technology to trial P2P transactions 
in microgrids in the Philippines. Participants can buy and sell electricity via the Energo phone app and 
all data is quantified by Energo smart meters (Domingo, 2017). 
P2P trials are also taking place elsewhere internationally, such as Vandebron in the Netherlands 
(Vandebron, 2017); SonnenCommunity in Germany, which enables community members to share their 
excess solar PV electricity via sonnenBatteries in a virtual pool system (Sonnen, 2017) and in Perth 
Australia, supplier Power Ledger is running a trial which involves 10 households in a gated community 
trading their excess solar energy between each other (Vorrath, 2016).  
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Table 12 Barriers to P2P Trading 
Theme Barrier Possible Solution 
Licensed Supplier 
Issue 
Customers cannot trade electricity between 
themselves without a TPLS. The supplier 
undertakes all the supplier obligations - 
mitigating the imbalance risk, paying use of 
system charges etc.  
In addition, customers can only have one 
licensed supplier per property. However, if 
customers were able to have more than one 
supplier this would in turn raise issues 
regarding the balance of power, which supplier 
would be responsible for balancing obligations, 
security obligations and environmental policy 
obligations etc. 
‘Future supply market arrangements – 
call for evidence’ launched in November 
2017. Initial way forward expected 
Spring 2018. 
Regulatory Sandbox trials commencing 
in conjunction with Ofgem to assess 
barriers. 
Billing and 
Settlement 
Billing and settlement also has to be through 
one licensed supplier – which could potentially 
lead to double counting if issue not addressed. 
As above. 
Metering Unknown whether SMETS2 meters would be 
able to handle more than one supplier per 
meter point. 
Smart meter rollout is not anticipated to be 
finalised until 2020. HH settlement is currently 
an option for domestic and small business 
customers but is not as yet mandatory. 
Issues with accessing smart meter data – DNOs 
and P2P platform providers cannot see 
customers smart meter data due to data 
protection issues. 
Need sophisticated metering to 
determine what volume is being sold 
P2P. 
HH settlement would be needed in 
order to participate. 
 
Resolution needed on who can access 
smart meter data.  
Data DNOs currently only have limited visibility 
down to 33kV asset level with no visibility 
below this. They also have no real 
understanding of the amount of DER 
operational on the network at the street / 
household level. A more granular level of detail 
will be needed in order to establish what is 
happening at the customer / connection level. 
Granular data and sophisticated IT 
solutions are required at the DNO level. 
WPD have signaled that they anticipate 
this to be in place (for their own network 
areas) by the end of RIIO-1 (2023). 
This data should be publicly accessible 
in order to facilitate P2P exchanges. 
BEIS & Ofgem should provide 
regulatory clarity over data – in 
particular encourage data sharing 
between the SO, DNOs and suppliers at 
the lowest possible granularity. This can 
include data regarding network 
constraints and the availability of DER 
on the network. 
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Blockchain Blockchain is being hailed as a revolutionary 
mechanism for trading energy but the 
blockchain process itself is hugely energy 
resourceful (Proof of Work – quantum 
computer cracking cryptography) or 
determined by those with the most financial 
claim (Proof of Stake) and transactions are not 
financially regulated.  
Ofgem are considering questions 
around security, customer acceptance, 
dispute resolution and underwriting in 
blockchain scenarios. 
Network 
Charging 
Reduced DUoS charges are not currently 
available without a derogation. 
All of network charging will be reviewed 
through the Charging Futures work on 
residual and forward-looking charges. 
Current thoughts at Ofgem are that 
network charges should be fair for all 
users and so there could potentially be a 
charge per transaction on all P2P 
trading. 
FiT Unknown how P2P will affect FiT payments – if 
export tariff has to be forfeited this reduces 
profitability. 
FiT export tariffs currently based on 
50% of generation total – and paid by 
the supplier. Customers could either 
forfeit export payments or sophisticated 
metering could establish what has 
actually been purchased elsewhere. 
 
Financial Reward It is not easy to see a financial benefit to P2P 
trading due to the above issues and if 
customers can receive higher payments from 
alternative markets they will probably seek 
those first. 
Although there appears to be little 
financial reward at present due to 
regulatory issues more profit could be 
realised through reduced network 
charges and the removal of trading 
through a TPLS.  
There could also be a more profitable 
solution in demand generation coupling 
i.e. if a generator could offer DTU to a 
local business in order to overcome 
curtailment this could lead to a cheaper 
electricity deal for the business whilst 
the generator could export when they 
would otherwise have been curtailed. 
Customer 
engagement 
Domestic customers may like the idea of being 
able to trade with their local community but 
they may require a high level of automation in 
order to participate. 
For example, the Wadebridge Sunshine Tariff 
ToU trial saw more demand shifting when 
processes were automated (Regen, 2017). 
 
P2P platforms should offer automated 
solutions for domestic customers who 
would prefer this. 
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6.6 THE ROLE OF LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICING 
OVERVIEW 
The underlying principle of locational marginal pricing (LMP) is that the energy price varies from one 
location to another location in the presence of congestion and loss in the system (NPTEL, 2017). 
Therefore, in a LMP market there is not a single wholesale energy price but potentially many different 
nodal prices. These are established by using an algorithm which takes into account losses and network 
constraints (Ofgem, 2017k). Currently there is no differential made in the GB wholesale market price of 
electricity which reflects these different nodal prices, but if they were recognised and valued at the 
distribution level, LMP could incentivise the development of DER at more optimal locations within the 
network and help relieve network constraints. 
 
BENEFITS OF LMP 
A study by the University of Cambridge Energy Policy Research Group in 2017 highlighted that the 
scope for LMP in GB has increased recently with improvements in computing and smart metering. They 
claim that a move towards more granular electricity prices could help improve location decisions for 
future generation investment and enhance the value of greater system decentralisation (Newbery et 
al., 2017). For instance, with LMP excessive siting of RES in a particular area could depress local power 
prices and thus signal the need to locate subsequent RES installations elsewhere on the network (ibid). 
The advantages to LMP at the distribution level would be that prosumers could get a better reflection 
of the value of their power when selling any surplus at high value locations; and that the DNO could see 
more assets being provided at optimal locations on the network for managing local distribution 
network congestion. LMP therefore has the potential to reduce network congestion through increasing 
generation / demand at high value locations and flattening the load in constrained areas. 
 
REGULATORY AND MARKET BARRIERS TO LMP 
A report by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) explains that in many international power 
systems, the spatial differentiation of prices due to network losses and constraints is ignored, with LMP 
occurring mainly at transmission level in North and South America and Australia (MIT, 2016). However, 
to their knowledge, LMP is not currently used at the distribution level in any power system 
internationally. 
LMP is an untried system in GB, and indeed anywhere globally at the distribution level. Ofgem have 
signaled that they believe LMP to be highly complex and that it has unclear potential in its application 
at distribution level. They consider that  it is also ‘very difficult to see how LMP could be implemented in 
a way consistent with the current self-dispatch model’ (Ofgem, 2017k). Ofgem have therefore 
discounted LMP as a concept in their recent consultation on the Reform of electricity network access 
and forward-looking charges; however, they do state that LMP is a key area where signals need to be 
better (ibid). 
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Cambridge’s Energy Policy Research Group agree that LMP is difficult to implement in self-dispatch 
power exchanges and is usually managed in central dispatch markets internationally. However, in GB, 
there have been arguments made that balancing charges should be nodal, so that generators face the 
right prices for marginal output decisions (Newbery et al., 2017) .   
However the main barrier to LMP in GB is likely to be that it is discriminatory to customers based on 
their location. Whilst some customers would achieve a reduction in wholesale prices, others would see 
much higher prices being applied. This would be politically difficult to implement and Ofgem, in their 
role as regulator, are likely to discount LMP for domestic customers at least on those grounds. 
Table 13 Barriers to LMP 
Barrier Potential Solution 
It is likely that Ofgem will consider LMP 
to be discriminatory, as customers in 
one location would pay higher 
wholesale prices than customers living 
elsewhere on the network; thus making 
LMP politically infeasible. 
Ofgem are not considering LMP during 
the current network charging reform. 
 
In Ofgem’s role as regulator they will want to evaluate whether LMP is 
discriminatory to customers. However they may wish to consider 
whether there is a different case to be made for I&C customers rather 
than domestic customers. 
Distribution level LMP is not used in any 
international energy market. 
LMP is completely untried at the distribution level.  
LMP is not suited to the self-dispatch 
wholesale market model. 
LMP is better suited to power markets with central dispatch, where 
LMP can achieve a more efficient dispatch to avoid congestion. 
However in self-dispatch power markets, with liquidity of pricing, LMP 
isn’t a consideration at present and its effectiveness has been 
questioned (Singh et al., 1998). In GB, arguments have been made for 
balancing charges to be nodal, so that generators face the right prices 
for marginal output decisions (Newbery et al., 2017).  
  
Data Gap - this model requires the DNO 
to have data on the real-time power 
flow on the network and an 
understanding of what’s happening 
both behind and in front of any network 
constraint. 
 
This data is not at present available although WPD have set out 
timescales within their DSO Transition Programme for delivering new 
data and IT products. These are expected to be delivered by the end of 
ED-1 in line with WPDs stance of being ‘market ready’ by 2023. 
Data sharing. Once these data systems are available at the DNO level clarification will 
be needed regarding data sharing between the DNO and third parties. 
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SECTION SUMMARY 
The 29 actions identified in the Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan are a good building block towards 
removing regulatory barriers for flexibility providers. In addition, research initiatives through the 
Sandbox trials and round tables are welcomed. Ofgem should now begin to seriously consider 
alternative market models and trading initiatives, in order to establish whether these regulatory 
improvements will actually provide the correct mechanisms to unlock future flexibility markets.  
Indeed, it is known that there are still regulatory and market barriers to be overcome as discussed 
throughout this section and further decisions to be made. Lessons could also be learnt from other 
international arenas, especially California and New York, which are several years ahead of GB in their 
market transformation. They have already begun to identify and tackle their own barriers and 
acknowledgement of these by GB could assist a swifter implementation of market change. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
The requirement to decarbonise the GB electricity system, alongside the falling costs of renewable 
technologies and developments in IT capabilities, provides GB with an opportunity for systemic change.  
However, in order for this change to be realised, BEIS and Ofgem need to provide the correct 
regulatory impetus to ensure a coherent market transformation. This has not happened to date, 
leading to a situation where renewable technologies are viewed by DNOs as system interrupters and 
the primary cause of network balancing and constraint issues.  
Indeed, DNOs have been slow in acknowledging the system benefits which DER can offer if managed 
intelligently, leading to a situation where much of the change occurring at the network and market 
levels at present is reactionary. Change is therefore taking place in a disjointed piecemeal fashion, 
instead of being part of a coordinated effort to transform to a smart, flexible energy system, despite 
the stated intention of BEIS and Ofgem. This is in direct contrast to the energy system transformation 
occurring in New York and California, where Commissioners have seized the initiative and told 
distribution utility companies what needs to happen and by when to realise the potential of DER at 
scale. 
This report has highlighted a range of regulatory and policy barriers to one particular innovative market 
model approach, the local energy market approach. The regulatory barriers faced by local energy 
markets could seriously hamper their operation in the short-term and inhibit them from being adopted 
more widely. 
The transition from DNOs to DSOs should be the biggest game changer for enabling local energy 
markets. A fully functioning energy market at the distribution level would enable a wide range of 
services, adding value to the system through more intelligent management of renewables; thus 
enabling more renewable connections to be made. However, as shown, BEIS and Ofgem have left all 
transition decisions to be made by the network operators themselves, rather than setting a long-term 
strategic vision for future network development and operation. This has allowed the DNOs to set their 
own timescales and to decide for themselves what can and can’t be achieved on individual networks.  
The recent consultations held by Ofgem regarding network charging have also been disappointing. 
Ofgem’s viewpoint that the mechanism for charging will be ‘policy agnostic’ is extremely short-sighted. 
How to charge for using the networks in future is a major decision which cannot be determined without 
first assessing how we want the networks to be used. If Ofgem want to enable DSO activities and 
localised energy market services such as P2P trading, then the network costs will be different to the 
traditional one-way passive energy flow costs. If Ofgem want to incentivise customer behaviour 
changes to increase the uptake of DER then the way in which we pay for networks should also be 
different. The mechanism and the policy intent should therefore be complementary, with the 
mechanism designed specifically to achieve the desired policy outcome as is happening in Australia. 
There the desired policy intent is to incentivise the uptake of DER and the charging mechanism 
complements this through support payments for NWA and a range of network tariffs and benefit 
sharing schemes related to customer behaviours. 
In GB, whilst BEIS and Ofgem claim they want a ‘smart, flexible energy system’ they are taking a very 
inactive approach to achieving one. Although the proposed policy changes to storage requirements, 
access to markets and value stacking outlined in the Smart Systems and Sustainability Plan are 
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welcomed, these can be seen to be the easy ‘quick win’ answers; whilst the more difficult questions 
remain unanswered. These include questions surrounding the enablement of DSR and independent 
aggregators to access the wholesale and balancing markets. Should independent aggregators be made 
Balancing Responsible Parties? How should the relationship between aggregators and suppliers be 
formalised? Providing solutions to these barriers would help unlock DSRs potential. However, due to 
poor policy development and design choices, that opportunity has not yet been realised (SEDC, 2017). 
The Centrica LEM project is meanwhile attempting to navigate through this uncertain regulatory 
environment, aiming to enable new localised services which maximise the use of DER and which 
alleviate balancing and network constraints through the offer of intelligent solutions. However, initially, 
only use cases linking with existing markets (or not otherwise in breach of regulations) can be trialled. 
More innovative use cases will likely require derogations or simulated trials. This is disappointing for the 
current operation of the LEM, but there is still much to be learnt through the simulation process; as this 
will reveal a fuller extent of the regulatory and market barriers faced by LEMs, which in turn should 
inform future policy discussions to assist decision makers in enabling the smart, flexible energy system 
to emerge. 
We therefore propose 6 interim drivers for change based on what we know now, and we will reconsider 
these drivers again at the end of the LEM project in 2020 when we have been able to analyse the actual 
impact of policy barriers on the LEM and its participants. At that stage we will have the qualitative data 
to show whether the barriers identified in this report are still considered to be the main barriers to a 
LEM; or whether there are additional barriers which haven’t yet been revealed; or whether solutions to 
these barriers have been found in the meantime: 
1. DSO TRANSITION – BEIS need to provide clarity on the DSO role and function as well as 
provide a strategic view of what needs to happen and by when in order to enable new 
innovative market solutions to emerge at the DSO level. We suggest that this should be before 
the end of ED-1 with an aim for all current DNOs to be offering DSO services during ED-2. DSOs 
also need to be incentivised though RIIO to undertake DER Plans of their networks to identify 
the value of DER down to the low voltage level which should enable domestic DSR and P2P 
trading. DSOs should also allow value stacking across markets in order for DER providers to 
realise the economic potential of their assets. 
 
2. NETWORK CHARGING – during the current Charging Futures programme BEIS and Ofgem 
need to consider that in order for the market to become smart and flexible they need to 
incentivise the take-up of DER rather than penalizing participants. We agree that the networks 
need to be paid for, but until we have agreed on how we want the networks to be used in future 
we cannot agree on how much they will cost and how this should be paid. BEIS and Ofgem 
need to think holistically or face unintended consequences of uncoordinated decisions which 
will impede the speed of market transformation. 
 
3. ACCESS RIGHTS – the Charging Futures programme is also currently debating new models 
for access rights to the network. Again a narrow viewpoint should not be maintained, with 
priority given to the model which best realises the potential for multiple small-scale DER to 
connect to the networks in a timely, cost-effective manner and which ends the current LIFO 
arrangements which undermine financial viability.  This could include benefits to siting non-
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domestic plant at lesser congested parts of the network. Barriers should not be introduced for 
domestic DER to connect to the network. 
  
4. SUPPLIER HUB MODEL – the current model stifles P2P trading and the ability of small scale 
generators to access markets. The supplier hub model therefore has to change in order to allow 
innovative local market solutions to emerge. However, any new model will need to be able to 
address balance of power issues, metering, settlement and billing, whilst still protecting 
customers’ rights. 
 
5. ACCESS TO THE WHOLESALE AND BALANCING MARKETS – barriers to DSR and 
independent aggregators need to be removed in order for DSR to participate in these markets. 
Although the relationship between independent aggregators and suppliers need to be 
formalized, this cannot happen in advance of any changes made to the role of suppliers. 
Indeed, if the supplier role changes dramatically this relationship aspect may no longer be a 
barrier to DSRs participation in these markets. 
 
6. DATA – BEIS & Ofgem should provide regulatory clarity over data which should be seen as a 
public good and shared as appropriate. In particular they should encourage data sharing 
between the TSO, DNOs, suppliers and platforms such as the LEM at the lowest possible 
granularity. This should include data regarding network constraints and the availability of DER 
on the network. It is acknowledged that the General Data Protection Regulation potentially 
make it difficult to access suitably granular meter data but this should also be explored.   
 
Action in line with these six drivers would alleviate many of the barriers discussed within this report, 
opening up access for local participants to engage in generation, supply and balancing at the 
distribution network level. We therefore propose that if GB is serious about wanting to transform its 
energy system; is serious about meeting its decarbonisation targets; and is serious about creating 
markets that work for flexibility; that BEIS and Ofgem need to respond accordingly in order for this 
potential to be realised. 
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8. APPENDIX 1 -  TABLE OF REGULATORY AND MARKET BARRIERS 
Table 14 shows a summary of all the barriers to the development of local distributed energy markets 
identified throughout this report. As the electricity system is a multi-dimensional system the barriers 
identified in one area also have impacts on other areas throughout this report.  
Table 14 Regulatory and Market Barriers 
 
Barrier Possible Solutions 
 SUPPLIER HUB MODEL  
1.  The supplier hub model provides a barrier 
for new trading arrangements. 
Changes are needed to the supplier hub model to enable 
innovative local trading initiatives such as the LEM to fully 
participate in providing market solutions. 
 
 ANCILLARY SERVICES  
2.  
Difficult for smaller generators, DSR and 
storage to access. 
Rationalisation of services to simplify process and align 
timescales for tendering. National Grid will also trial auctions 
from late 2018. 
 
3.  
Too many products. Product rationalisation taking place currently. 
 
4.  
Multiple timelines for procurement. Timelines to become aligned. 
 
5.  
Stacking of contracts. National Grid have stated that stacking across products will 
be possible, which will increase financial viability for small 
generators / DSR providers. 
 
 WHOLESALE MARKET  
6.  
Difficult for small generators to access. The clip size in the Power UK Continuous Market was 
reduced to 0.1 MW to assist with smaller generators 
accessing the wholesale market. However, the costs, 
regulations and licensing requirements are prohibitive to 
many small generators. If they choose the SVA route then 
they can only trade with one licensed supplier. This may be 
overcome through any changes to the Supplier Hub model. 
Additionally Modification P355 (see BM section) may be 
helpful in overcoming access to the BM requirement. 
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7.  
No provision for explicit DSR in the 
wholesale market. 
DSR currently can only be provided by the supplier of the 
DSR-provider as there is no mechanism for making bids and 
offers for a customer’s potential demand, since there is no 
baselining of a customer’s demand against which such 
bids/offers may be assessed. However Modification P344 to 
the BSC could be helpful. 
 
8.  
Lack of access for aggregators. Create a new route for independent aggregators to access 
the BM. Will need modifications to the BSC as per BM below. 
 
 BALANCING MARKET  
9.  
Difficult for smaller generators to access 
the BM. 
Modifications P344 & P355 ‘Introduction of a BM Lite 
Balancing Mechanism’ should be helpful in this respect. 
 
10.  
Lack of access for Aggregators & DSR. Modification P344 brings the BSC in line with Project TERRE 
requirements which states that DSR should have a level 
playing field with other forms of generation in accessing the 
BM. Also, aggregators should be considered alongside P355 
(although they are currently excluded). 
 
 
CAPACITY MARKET  
11.  Access to the CM for RES. RES receiving RO or CfD payments are ineligible to bid into 
the CM – which automatically rules out the majority of RES 
generation. 
 
12.  
Access to the CM for both DSR and 
Storage. 
Although DSR and storage are accessing CM their respective 
share percentages are still very low. Decision to be made 
over whether their share % should be increased, or whether 
it is better to use these resources for real-time balancing of 
the system. 
 
13.  
Restrictions on the ability to stack 
revenues from ancillary services alongside 
CM. 
 
Allow stacking of revenues between the CM and ancillary 
services. Review exclusivity clauses. 
 
14.  
Aggregators can’t change the portfolio of 
DSR participants which make up a CM 
unit. Therefore, if one participant 
withdraws the whole contract is nullified. 
Enable asset reallocation by DSR providers. 
    EPG    81 
 
15.  
By determining a strict reliability standard 
in advance this can lead to over-
contracting of capacity, thereby limiting 
the scope for ancillary services (Reserve) 
to provide peak demand. 
 
Reduce reliability standard and / or allow flexibility to 
provide real-time balancing. 
16.  
The CM is keeping old plant in operation 
which will prove direct competition for 
local assets. 
BEIS / Ofgem need to consider what types of generation 
they are trying to encourage. With many contracts being 
awarded to existing fossil fueled plants they are prolonging 
the life of these generators to the detriment of flexibility 
providers. The CM Rules need to be amended to discourage 
this. 
 
17.  
The recent falling clearing prices of CM 
contracts (2018 auctions) is proving 
unattractive for storage providers. 
 
As above – review CM Rules regarding old ‘dirty’ plant. 
18.  
By relying on the CM to manage future 
perceived problems it stifles investment 
and development of other low carbon 
solutions to the problem such as DSR, 
storage and demand reduction. 
 
As above – review CM Rules regarding old ‘dirty’ plant. 
 NETWORKS  
19.  There is no set timescale for DNOs to 
transition to becoming DSOs.  
Not all DNOs appear to want to change or 
feel the need to change their operations. 
 
WPD are actively working towards transition to DSO status.  
WPD have committed to establishing their DSO role by the 
end of ED-1 (2023) but this is not the case for all DNOs. And 
indeed, WPDs position is to be ‘market ready’ by 2023, 
anticipating that most of the DSO functions will come online 
during RIIO-2 (2023-2031). 
WPD will undertake an over-arching ‘DSO Transition 
Programme’ to lead this work. 
BEIS / Ofgem should set a timescale for all DNOs to commit 
to. 
20.  Ambiguities as set out in the Open 
Networks Project about who should lead 
and coordinate on procurement of 
balancing services in future as distributed 
generation grows. 
WPD would prefer to move to one of the DSO-led models 
identified in the Open Networks Project (Table 4), 
presumably Option 4 or 6 as they claim the DSO-led models 
‘will result in the most efficient whole system outcome’.  
Either of those options should be beneficial to LEMs as these 
both have a wide role for the operation of DER. There may 
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be market conflicts though in Option 6 with the role of the 
DSO as a commercial aggregator, which need to be 
assessed. 
WPD recognise that data sharing with the TSO will be critical 
to optimising the network. 
 
21.  
DNOs currently only have limited visibility 
down to 33kV asset level with no visibility 
below this. They also have no real 
understanding of the amount of DER 
operational on the network at the street / 
household level. 
WPD have signaled that they will primarily deploy 
supporting infrastructure on the EHV network down to the 
33kV asset level before increasing visibility at LV levels. UoE 
have responded to WPD that they don’t agree with this 
stance as DER and DSR will continue to develop across all 
levels of the network. Even if it is not realistic to upgrade the 
whole network at the moment then it would make sense to 
take one part of the network (like Cornwall with current high 
constraints) and upgrade the visibility and control across all 
voltage levels early on in the DSO process to provide some 
vital learning for later stages of the transformation (Bray et 
al., 2017).  
22.  
Enhanced sensing with active technical 
and commercial mechanisms is required. 
WPD will develop a platform (Project EFFS) to provide 
visibility, warn of critical peak price periods and take offers 
of DSR service.  
23.  There is uncertainty over how many 
services the DSOs will be procuring from 
distribution markets and how many 
services they can operate themselves.  
 
WPD have indicated that these are likely to be reserve 
services for real power and voltage control (such as Flexible 
Power) rather than fast acting products such as frequency 
response. 
WPD have signaled that secondary trading markets such as 
the P2P market may be created for DER providers. 
WPD have stated that they will use a mixture of tenders and 
market based arrangements for procurement of services. 
However, there is still uncertainty over how much flexibility 
WPD will procure at this stage. 
 
24.  
DSOs should be encouraged to seek 
NWAs where this can be achieved at lower 
cost than reinforcement. RIIO helps in this 
effect, with a shift to RAV from totex 
rather than capex. 
More acknowledgement needed of the value of network 
savings that could be achieved through deferment of 
network upgrades and potential recompense to those 
providing these NWA solutions. 
WPD have signaled that they will seek NWA from DSR and 
flexibility providers where issues can be solved for a lower 
total cost than reinforcing the network. 
    EPG    83 
 
Decisions will be taken in ‘investment decision timescales’ to 
reduce, defer or negate conventional build. These timescales 
will presumably correspond to RIIO timescales. 
DNOs should include in their Business Plans how they will 
include NWAs and the types of suitable projects which will 
be considered along with timescales for implementation. 
 
25.  Alternative connections such as ANM, 
Timed, Soft-Intertrip and Export Limited 
in CMZ are enabling more connections to 
be made to the network, but these come 
with penalties (such as LIFO) which 
undermine the operational capacity and 
financial viability of DER.  
WPD are extending these products to all 
WPD areas and will include demand and 
storage connections. 
One solution used by DNOs is active network management 
(ANM) in Constraint Managed Zones (CMZ) which allows a 
new generator to connect within the zone for a quicker 
connection with a lower connection fee, in exchange for the 
DNO being able to curtail generation at times of system 
stress. This is a financially competitive solution for the DNOs 
as they still receive a connection fee and they can avoid 
network reinforcement costs by curtailing generation 
instead of upgrading the network. However, it incurs 
financial risk and uncertainty to the generator as the DNOs 
can curtail generation themselves, rather than procure 
market solutions for flexibility, thus undermining the value in 
market-based flexibility services.  
Curtailment also often means that it is the renewable 
generation which is turned off first in the LIFO queue, 
undermining national targets and causing higher power 
prices. 
Therefore ANM is not a good long-term solution to 
achieving a smart and flexible energy market at the 
distribution level. 
The issue of connections is being raised through the 
Charging Futures work (see Section 5) which could either 
have a positive or negative effect on future connection 
arrangements depending on the model chosen. In addition, 
WPD have committed to creating a localised visibility 
platform (which will be publicly available) to demonstrate 
where there is congestion / capacity on the network. 
 
26.  
Stacking of revenues needed across DSO 
services and ancillary services to ensure 
viability. 
WPD have signaled that they will be open to stacking of 
services in order to allow customers to participate in 
transmission and distribution level markets. 
 
27.  
RIIO still gives network operators the 
ability to ‘game’ the system in setting 
their revenues and innovation projects 
have to date been seen as add-ons rather 
than BAU.  
The move to totex is welcomed but innovative solutions 
need to be seen as business as usual, not interesting add-ons 
with no long-term benefits to customers.  
RIIO-2 should therefore provide price controls which 
encourage active participation in the DSO transition and 
seek flexible solutions to network management. Clarification 
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needs to be made as to whether the DSO transition costs will 
come out of RIIO-2 revenues (and therefore paid for by 
customers through network charging) or whether there 
should be a separate pot to fund this.   
The way in which the networks set their revenues has a huge 
implication on network charging as discussed in Section 5 
which will have an impact on consumer behaviour. 
 
28.  WPD acknowledge that stronger 
locational signals for distribution network 
charges will have an effect on the siting of 
additional DER providers. 
 
Network charges are currently being reviewed through the 
Charging Futures work being undertaken by Ofgem (see 
Section 5). 
29.  
Ambiguities over whether DNOS should 
own / operate storage – which would be 
uncompetitive to flexibility providers. 
Ofgem signaled that DNOs shouldn’t own / operate storage 
as it is uncompetitive to the market. UKPN and Northern 
Powergrid however have argued against this. WPDs position 
is that storage owned / operated by DNOs should only be 
used as a ‘last resort’ if the market fails to deliver. 
 
 NETWORK CHARGING  
30.  
Targeted Charging Review – residual 
charges 
Any changes to the existing charging 
regime will have a potential impact on 
how prosumers will use the network in 
future. Whilst it may be sensible to make 
these customers pay a fair charge for their 
ability to rely on the network this should 
be done in a way which still incentivises 
prosumers for their positive actions. 
 
BEIS / Ofgem need to need to consider what type of 
customer behaviour they are wanting to incentivise / 
disincentivise through adopting any new methodology. 
Currently only the ex-ante and ex-post capacity demand 
charges option reward prosumers for their behaviour. 
Keep a watching brief on developments on this in 2018 and 
engage in consultation events. 
31.  Forward looking charges and access rights 
Details are very sketchy at the moment 
but could have widespread implications 
for connections. 
 
Keep a watching brief on developments on this in 2018 and 
engage in consultation events. 
32.  
Embedded Benefits – the slashing of EB 
will have a major negative effect on the 
revenue of small scale generators. 
This retrograde decision has already been made and will 
implemented from April 2018, despite Ofgem facing a 
judicial review in January 2018. 
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DSR  
33.  
Access to ancillary services. Rationalisation of services to simplify process and align 
timescales for tendering. National Grid will also trial auctions 
from late 2018. 
34.  Restrictions on the ability to stack 
revenues from ancillary services alongside 
CM. 
 
Allow stacking of revenues between the CM and ancillary 
services. Review exclusivity clauses. 
 
35.  
Access to Balancing Market. 
 
Provide for participation from independent aggregators. 
 
36.  
Baselining & settlement. Clarify the role of aggregators in regard to relationship with 
suppliers / set a code of conduct. 
Should aggregators be balancing responsible parties i.e. 
exposed to imbalance pricing? 
 
37.  
Aggregators can’t change the portfolio of 
DSR participants which make up a CM 
unit. Therefore, if one participant 
withdraws the whole contract is nullified. 
Enable asset reallocation by DSR providers. 
 
38.  
Technical issues. Simplify metering requirements. 
Improve forward-looking signals for network usage to 
encourage price flexibility related DSR.  
 
39.  
Structure of network charges. Being reviewed through the Embedded Benefits Review / 
TCR / forward looking charges review.  
 
40.  Limited awareness of DSR & financial 
benefits of DSR. 
Power Responsive project launched by National Grid to raise 
awareness and engage with businesses. 
 
41.  
Limited access to DSR market for 
domestic and smaller non-domestic 
customers due mainly to smart meter 
rollout not being complete. 
Smart meter rollout should be complete by 2020. 
42.  
Limited availability of smart tariffs, smart 
appliances. 
Half hourly settlement – introduce mandatory HHS for 
domestic and smaller non-domestic customers. 
Encourage smart tariffs. 
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Set standards for smart appliances. 
Domestic energy storage. 
EV charge points & Vehicle to Grid technologies. 
 
43.  
Cyber security. Study commissioned to assess magnitude of cyber security 
risk up to 2030. 
 
 AGGREGATORS  
44.  
No legally defined role for independent 
aggregators. 
To enable independent aggregators to enter the market at 
scale, it is critical that their role and responsibilities are 
clarified. In particular, it is important that the relationships 
between suppliers, balancing responsible parties (BRPs), and 
independent aggregators are clear, fair, and allow for fair 
competition (SEDC, 2017). 
45.  
Balancing Mechanism – no current route 
to access BM. 
Create a new route for independent aggregators to access 
the BM. Will need code modifications. 
 
46.  
Capacity Market - Aggregators can’t 
change the portfolio of DSR participants 
which make up a CM unit. Therefore, if 
one participant withdraws the whole 
contract is nullified. 
Simplify metering requirements. 
Stack revenue streams across markets. 
Enable asset reallocation. 
47.  
Other markets. Ensure a level playing field for access to additional energy 
markets where aggregators can be accommodated 
efficiently. 
Improve signals for network usage. 
 
48.  
Measurement - 
Potential for gaming. 
Measure DSR volumes and ensure that baseline gaming 
opportunities are mitigated. 
49.  
Cost reflective pricing. Allow for payments to cover the cost of energy sold on by 
the aggregator, which was initially sourced by the supplier to 
help ensure a more cost-reflective supply curve at a system 
level and a level playing field between different 
technologies. 
50.  
Balancing responsibility and delivery risk. Both balancing costs and delivery risks should be borne by 
the parties that created them. 
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 STORAGE  
51.  
Limited understanding of the complexity 
surrounding the need for both import and 
export capacity, and the differing uses, 
sizes and locations of connections can 
result in lengthy and expensive 
connections. 
Ofgem will work with industry and DNOs to improve the 
connection process, for example by introducing flexible 
connections which will be cheaper and quicker. 
However, flexible connections (i.e. ANM) can have a 
detrimental financial impact on distribution connected 
storage in that batteries could be prevented from 
discharging at optimal times due to DNO contractual 
limitations.  
 
52.  
Distribution connected storage currently 
pays both import and export network 
charges as it ‘uses the network for both’. 
The Targeted Charging Review (Ofgem, 2017o) considers 
the current system of network residual charges to ensure 
storage doesn’t pay the ‘demand residual’ element of 
network charges at T & D level.  
 
53.  
Different definitions of storage are used 
for different regulatory purposes, 
including licensing and the capacity 
market. Need to develop a common 
definition for use across different policy 
areas. 
 
Ofgem consulted on the regulatory framework for electricity 
storage in Sept 17 (Ofgem, 2017a) and affirmed that the 
Electricity Act 1989 will be amended to include a definition 
of storage as a distinct subset of the generation asset class. 
Storage is also being defined in the Grid Code (GC096). 
54.  
Several levy costs are applied twice to 
storage (once on charging and once on 
supply), including the costs of the 
Renewables Obligation, Feed-in Tariff, 
Capacity Market and the Climate Change 
Levy. 
This results in double counting of supply 
to the consumer on the same electricity. 
 
Storage should be exempted from final consumption levies. 
Ofgem are therefore proposing a new licence condition 
‘Condition E1’ to provide clarity that ‘The licensee shall not 
have self-consumption as the primary function when 
operating its storage facility’ (Ofgem, 2017a) to overcome 
the double counting issue. 
55.  
As storage is yet to be classified or 
defined, it is unclear how storage fits 
within the planning framework. Storage is 
currently defined in planning as an 
‘electricity generating station’ causing 
uncertainties over whether it should be in 
national guidance or dealt with at the 
local planning level. 
A review of planning legislation will assess whether guidance 
can be simplified i.e. by including a national planning 
threshold for storage and associated planning guidance. 
However, there is no timescale set for amending this. 
56.  
Lack of clarity how storage might interact 
with renewable installations receiving 
support under the RO, CFD or FIT regimes 
Ofgem produced Draft Guidance Dec 17  (Ofgem, 2017b) to 
provide clarity on when storage can co-locate alongside 
renewable generation without risking agreements. Ofgem 
consider that where the scheme requirements are being 
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met, storage can be deployed without risk to accreditation, 
although decisions would be made on a case-by-case basis. 
 
57.  
The EU ‘Winter Package’ states that DSOs 
should not be allowed to own, develop, 
manage or operate storage in order to 
promote market competition. 
BEIS & Ofgem announced that DNOs should not own or 
operate storage to allow market competition. This should be 
beneficial to the LEM but some DNO’s have argued against 
this. 
 
 P2P TRADING  
58.  
Customers cannot trade electricity 
between themselves without a TPLS. The 
supplier undertakes all the supplier 
obligations - mitigating the imbalance 
risk, paying use of system charges etc.  
In addition, customers can only have one 
licensed supplier per property. However, if 
customers were able to have more than 
one supplier this would in turn raise issues 
regarding the balance of power, which 
supplier would be responsible for 
balancing obligations, security obligations 
and environmental policy obligations etc. 
 
‘Future supply market arrangements – call for evidence’ 
launched in November 2017. Initial way forward expected 
Spring 2018. 
Regulatory Sandbox trials commencing in conjunction with 
Ofgem to assess barriers. 
59.  
Billing and settlement also has to be 
through one licensed supplier – which 
could potentially lead to double counting 
if issue not addressed. 
 
As above. 
60.  
Unknown whether SMETS2 meters would 
be able to handle more than one supplier 
per meter point. 
Smart meter rollout is not anticipated to 
be finalised until 2020. HH settlement is 
currently an option for domestic and small 
business customers but is not as yet 
mandatory. 
Issues with accessing smart meter data – 
DNOs and P2P platform providers cannot 
see customers smart meter data due to 
data protection issues. 
Need sophisticated metering to determine what volume is 
being sold P2P. 
HH settlement would be needed in order to participate. 
 
Resolution needed on who can access smart meter data.  
61.  
DNOs currently only have limited visibility 
down to 33kV asset level with no visibility 
below this. They also have no real 
understanding of the amount of DER 
Granular data and sophisticated IT solutions are required at 
the DNO level. WPD have signaled that they anticipate this 
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operational on the network at the street / 
household level. A more granular level of 
detail will be needed in order to establish 
what is happening at the customer / 
connection level. 
to be in place (for their own network areas) by the end of 
RIIO-1 (2023). 
This data should be publicly accessible in order to facilitate 
P2P exchanges. 
BEIS & Ofgem should provide regulatory clarity over data – 
in particular encourage data sharing between the SO, DNOs 
and suppliers at the lowest possible granularity. This can 
include data regarding network constraints and the 
availability of DER on the network. 
 
62.  
Blockchain is being hailed as a 
revolutionary mechanism for trading 
energy but the blockchain process itself is 
hugely energy resourceful (Proof of Work 
– quantum computer cracking 
cryptography) or determined by those 
with the most financial claim (Proof of 
Stake) and transactions are not financially 
regulated.  
Ofgem are considering questions around security, customer 
acceptance, dispute resolution and underwriting in 
blockchain scenarios. 
63.  
Reduced DUoS charges are not currently 
available without a derogation. 
All of network charging will be reviewed through the 
Charging Futures work on residual and forward-looking 
charges. 
Current thoughts at Ofgem are that network charges should 
be fair for all users and so there could potentially be a charge 
per transaction on all P2P trading. 
 
64.  
Unknown how P2P will affect FiT 
payments – if export tariff has to be 
forfeited this reduces profitability. 
FiT export tariffs currently based on 50% of generation total 
– and paid by the supplier. Customers could either forfeit 
export payments or sophisticated metering could establish 
what has actually been purchased elsewhere. 
 
65.  It is not easy to see a financial benefit to 
P2P trading due to the above issues and if 
customers can receive higher payments 
from alternative markets they will 
probably seek those first. 
Although there appears to be little financial reward at 
present due to regulatory issues more profit could be 
realised through reduced network charges and the removal 
of trading through a TPLS.  
There could also be a more profitable solution in demand 
generation coupling i.e. if a generator could offer DTU to a 
local business in order to overcome curtailment this could 
lead to a cheaper electricity deal for the business whilst the 
generator could export when they would otherwise have 
been curtailed. 
 
66.  
Domestic customers may like the idea of 
being able to trade with their local 
P2P platforms should offer automated solutions for 
domestic customers who would prefer this. 
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community but they may require a high 
level of automation in order to participate. 
For example, the Wadebridge Sunshine 
Tariff ToU trial saw more demand shifting 
when processes were automated (Regen, 
2017). 
 
LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICING  
67.  
It is likely that Ofgem will consider LMP to 
be discriminatory, as customers in one 
location would pay higher wholesale 
prices than customers living elsewhere on 
the network; thus making LMP politically 
infeasible. 
Ofgem are not considering LMP during 
the current network charging reform. 
 
In Ofgem’s role as regulator they will want to evaluate 
whether LMP is discriminatory to customers. However they 
may wish to consider whether there is a different case to be 
made for I&C customers rather than domestic customers. 
68.  
Distribution level LMP is not used in any 
international energy market. 
 
LMP is completely untried at the distribution level.  
69.  
LMP is not suited to the self-dispatch 
wholesale market model. 
LMP is better suited to power markets with central dispatch, 
where LMP can achieve a more efficient dispatch to avoid 
congestion. However in self-dispatch power markets, with 
liquidity of pricing, LMP isn’t a consideration at present and 
its effectiveness has been questioned (Singh et al., 1998). In 
GB, arguments have been made for balancing charges to be 
nodal, so that generators face the right prices for marginal 
output decisions (Newbery et al., 2017).   
 
70.  
Data Gap - this model requires the DNO to 
have data on the real-time power flow on 
the network and an understanding of 
what’s happening both behind and in 
front of any network constraint. 
This data is not at present available although WPD have set 
out timescales within their DSO Transition Programme for 
delivering new data and IT products. These are expected to 
be delivered by the end of ED-1 in line with WPDs stance of 
being ‘market ready’ by 2023. 
 
71.  
Data sharing.  Once these data systems are available at the DNO level 
clarification will be needed regarding data sharing between 
the DNO and third parties. 
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10. ACRONYMS 
 
ANM  active network management 
BAU  business as usual 
BETTA  British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements 
Big 6  British Gas, EDF Energy, npower, E.ON UK, Scottish Power & SSE 
BM   Balancing Market 
BMUs  Balancing Mechanism Units 
BRP  balancing responsible party 
BSC   Balancing and Settlement Code 
BSUoS  Balancing System use of System (charge) 
BTM  behind the meter 
CfD  contract for difference 
CfE  Call for Evidence  
CHP  combined heat and power 
CM  Capacity Market 
CMZ  constraint managed zone 
CUSC   Charging and Use of Services Code  
CVA  central volume allocation 
DCUSA  Distribution Charging and Use of Services Agreement  
DER   distributed energy resources  
DNO   Distribution Network Operator   
DSO  Distribution Service Operator 
DSP  Distribution Service Providers (New York model) 
DSR   demand side response  
DTU  demand turn up 
DUoS   Distribution Use of Service (charges)  
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EB  embedded benefits 
EFR  enhanced frequency response 
EG  embedded generators 
EHV  extra high voltage  
ENA  Energy Networks Association 
EPG  Energy Policy Group at the University of Exeter 
FFR  firm frequency response 
FiT  feed-in tariff 
GB   Great Britain 
GSP  grid supply point 
GW  gigawatt 
HHS  half hourly settlement 
IGov  Innovation and Governance Team, Energy Policy Group, UoE 
kV  kilovolt 
kW   kilowatt 
kWh  kilowatt hour 
LCT  low carbon technologies 
LEM  local energy market 
LMP  locational marginal pricing 
LV  low voltage 
MW  megawatt 
NG  National Grid 
NIA  network innovation allowance 
NIC  network innovation competition 
NWA  non-wire alternative 
NY REV  New York State’s Reforming the Energy Vision 
Ofgem  Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
P2P  Peer-to-Peer (trading) 
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PPA  Power Purchase Agreement 
RAV  Regulatory Asset Value (networks) 
RES  renewable energy systems 
RIIO   Regulation = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs  
RO  renewables obligation 
SEC  Smart Energy Code 
SCR  settlement code review 
SME  small and medium sized enterprises 
SMETS1 smart metering equipment technical specifications: first version 
SMETS2 smart metering equipment technical specifications: second version 
SO   System Operator  
STOR   Short-term Operating Reserve  
SVA  supplier volume allocation 
TERRE  Trans European Replacement Reserves Exchange  
TNUoS   Transmission Network Use of Service (charges)  
ToU  time of use (tariff) 
TPLS  third party licensed supplier 
TSO  Transmission System Operator (National Grid) 
UoE  University of Exeter 
UK  United Kingdom 
UKPN  UK Power Networks (DNO) 
WPD  Western Power Distribution (DNO) 
 
 
 
